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INTRODUCTION
Admiral James Stavridis collapsed in his chair, exhausted. The
four-star Navy admiral had just finished a six-month whirlwind
tour of over thirty nations, flying on a state-of-the-art military
aircraft surrounded by an enormous staff. He met with leaders from
every member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
the heads of Russia and Israel, and several prospective U.S. and
NATO allies. Not surprisingly, he met with each nation’s senior
military leaders and ministers of defense in an effort to strengthen
military-to-military relations and reinforce the bonds of the Atlantic
Alliance that date back to General Eisenhower and the end of the
Second World War.
Perhaps surprisingly, Admiral Stavridis also met with the
presidents of each nation, their foreign ministers, and a host of
diplomats. It was easy for his staff to set up meetings with just
about anyone in Europe. Indeed, everyone was clamoring to meet
Admiral Stavridis, the senior U.S. military officer in Europe who
possessed enormous operational authorities central to their own
nation’s defense. He also brought with him the promise of foreign
military sales, future military funding, and easy access to the vast
Washington national security apparatus. To many, he was the most
important American on the continent, a man worth knowing, and
someone possessing not just a military role but also an expanding
foreign relations role. When he called, presidents and prime
ministers picked up the phone and made time.1
What position in the vast military bureaucracy did Admiral
Stavridis hold? He had just been appointed by the President and
confirmed by Congress as the leader of the U.S. European
Command, one of five extraterritorial U.S. geographic combatant
commanders.2 These positions play an increasingly important but
not well-understood role in the largest military (and bureaucracy)
in the world. The 1947 National Security Act established these

1 This vignette is largely borrowed from JAMES STAVRIDIS, THE ACCIDENTAL ADMIRAL: A
SAILOR TAKES COMMAND AT NATO 28–30 (2014). In addition to his position as U.S. European
Commander, Admiral Stavridis was “dual-hatted” as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander
Europe. Id.
2 Donna Miles, Senate Confirms McChrystal, Stavridis, Fraser Nominations, AM. FORCES
PRESS SERVICES (June 11, 2009), http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54734.
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roles3 which some commentators have described as “viceroys”4 or
modern-day Roman “proconsuls.”5 But their full authorities lay
dormant for almost forty years only to be fully actuated in 1986 via
the Goldwater-Nichols Act.6 These combatant commanders lie at
the heart of what I refer to as the operational military, and their
authorities and influence are growing, largely unrestrained by
Congress and the Executive Branch.
Most reasonably well-informed people believe that executive
authority over the military has grown at the expense of
congressional authority for a variety of reasons, including
congressional dysfunction, some version of an “executive unbound,”
or an “Imperial Presidency” further facilitated by the nature of
modern warfare.7 That is not untrue, but it is only part of a much
larger story. Another part of the story—largely unexplored by
existing legal scholarship—is the military’s legal architecture and
agency design.
This Article offers a new way to think about the military. In doing
so, I argue that there are, in fact, two militaries residing within the
Department of Defense (DoD): an “operational” and an
“administrative” military.8 Each military has its own chain of
command, of critical importance to a hierarchical federal agency
that is backed by the force of criminal law. Understanding this dualmilitary bureaucracy reveals insights into national security

50 U.S.C. § 401 (2012).
Derek S. Reveron & Michelle D. Gavin, American Viceroys, in AMERICA’S VICEROYS: THE
MILITARY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1, 2 (Derek S. Reveron ed., 2004).
5 DANA PRIEST, THE MISSION: WAGING WAR AND KEEPING PEACE WITH AMERICA’S
MILITARY 70 (2003).
6 See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-433, 100 Stat. 992, 992 (1986) (stating its goal is “to place clear responsibility on the
commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands”).
7 See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 15 (2010) (“[L]aw does little to constrain the modern executive . . . .”);
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY ix (1973) (“The assumption of that
[war-making] power by the Presidency was gradual and usually under the demand or pretext
of emergency. It was as much a matter of congressional abdication as of presidential
usurpation.”). And Congress no longer declares war—the last declaration of war dates from
1942. See Garance Franke-Ruta, All the Previous Declarations of War, THE ATLANTIC (Aug.
31, 2013) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/all-the-previous-declarationsof-war/279246 (noting declarations against Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania).
8 I am the first legal scholar to describe the DoD’s agency design as a two-military divide
with these terms.
3
4
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governance with broad implications for how administrative law
interacts with the military and civilian oversight of the military.
The terms “administrative military” and “operational military”
are wholly absent from the text of the Constitution, and neither is
defined in law, regulation, or existing legal scholarship.9 The first
military, the operational military, is led by uniformed combatant
commanders and receives direction from the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Already powerful, these combatant
commanders’ powers are increasing.10 They not only plan and fight
the nation’s wars; they now perform an expanding menu of nontraditional military functions including foreign relations-type
functions that have historically been the province of the State
Department.11 Today’s combatant commanders have a continuous
presence abroad with massive staffs, resources, and forces.12 As
State Department personnel is reduced and its funding slashed,
combatant commanders fill the foreign policy void as the default
American representatives abroad.13
The operational military’s origins can be found in the
Constitution, statute and military doctrine.14 It is responsible for
planning and executing the nation’s war fighting, training foreign
forces, military-to-military engagement, and an increasing range of

9 The Commander in Chief Clause ensures that there is an elected civilian head of the
military. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States . . . .”); see also Christopher M. Bourne, Unintended
Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 18 JOINT FORCES QUART. 99, 100 (1998) (“The
Constitution fails to specify where the authority of the Commander in Chief ends and that of
Congress begins.”).
10 See, e.g., Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 1–8 (describing the increased powers and
influence of combatant commanders).
11 See ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME
EVERYTHING 79 (2016) (“Across the board, the military was moving into areas more
traditionally conceived of as civilian domains . . . [such as] the business of health care,
education, news and information, economic development, and local politics.”); PRIEST, supra
note 5, at 61–65 (describing the rise of combatant commanders and their role in foreign
policy).
12 See Combatant Commands, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/Know-YourMilitary/Combatant-Commands/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing and providing
additional information on the current DoD international combatant commands).
13 See BROOKS, supra note 11, at 102 (discussing the consequences of reducing professional
Foreign Service officers).
14 See infra Part II (explaining the origins of the operational and administrative
militaries).
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foreign-relations activities.15 It receives its forces (personnel,
equipment, weapons) from the administrative military.16
Uniformed combatant commanders and subordinate joint task force
commanders lead the operational military.17 Its day-to-day
implementation is governed by the doctrinal terms of combatant
command, operational control, and tactical control.18
The administrative military’s origins can be found in the
Constitution, statutes, and military doctrine.19 Its functions include
personnel management, staffing, recruiting, testing, training,
health care, equipping and hardware acquisition.20 It also provides
forces to the operational military.21 The civilian Secretaries of the
15 The DoD and other governmental agencies also have an enormous intelligence
apparatus reporting to the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to the existing
intelligence statutory framework dating from 2004. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
discuss the institutional mechanics of the intelligence community, but the operational and
administrative military divide has enormous follow-on consequences within the intelligence
community due to the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act and the
creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. See 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2012) et.
seq. (declaring the purposes and functions of the United States military). Further, while this
Article focuses on the administrative military, there is a sub-section of the administrative
military—the military defense agencies—that adds an additional layer of complexity to any
analysis, but which is beyond the scope of this Article. These seventeen defense agencies,
including the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Defense Finance and Accounting
Service (DFAS), account for an enormous budget ($85-90 billion) but are not the focus of the
Secretary of Defense or Congress and are subject to only sporadic oversight. 30 Years of
Goldwater-Nichols Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 114th Cong. 50
(2015) (statement of Dr. John Hamre, President and Chief Executive Officer, Center for
Strategic and International Studies) [hereinafter Goldwater-Nichols Hearing]; see also $125
Billion in Savings Ignored: Review of DoD’s Efficiency Study: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Government Reform, 115th Cong. 2–3 (2017) (prepared testimony of
Lawrence J. Korb) (“[Secretary of the Navy] Ray Mabus . . . complained that 20 [percent] of
the defense budget . . . went to the so-called ‘Fourth Estate,’ that is, the defense agencies . . .
that provide support to the armed forces. He called this pure overhead.”).
16 See infra Parts II.B–C, III.
17 See infra Parts II.B–C, III. The definition is largely derived from (1) Article II of the
Constitution to include the Commander in Chief clause; (2) statutes addressing the roles and
responsibility of the combatant commanders; and (3) the law of the chain of command and
military doctrine to include combatant command control, operational control, and tactical
control.
18 See infra Part III.B.
19 See infra Parts II.B–C.
20 See infra Parts II–III.
21 I define “forces” broadly as set forth in DoD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms to include “[a]n aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and
necessary support, or combination thereof . . . [or a] major subdivision of a fleet.” DEP’T OF
DEF., JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02: DEP’T OF DEF. DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED
TERMS 89 (as amended through Feb. 2016) [hereinafter DOD DICTIONARY].
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military departments and the uniformed heads of each military
branch—the service “chiefs”—largely lead the administrative
military.22 Its implementation is governed by the doctrinal term
administrative control.23
The administrative military serves the operational military.24
While both militaries ultimately report to the Secretary of Defense
and the Commander in Chief, the administrative military remains
the outsized focus of congressional oversight.25
The two-military divide creates two main problems: (1) it
incentivizes congressional focus on the administrative military at
the expense of operational military oversight; and (2) it facilitates
an internal bureaucratic misalignment in which the administrative
military too often provides the wrong forces (personnel, equipment,
weaponry) to the operational military.
Today, the DoD is the world’s largest bureaucracy and
employer.26 Its organizational set-up is complex, its size vast, and
its mission idiosyncratic: the DoD is responsible for the nation’s
defense including the lawful application of military force to fight
and win the nation’s wars.27 The very nature of its activities raises
22 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 5013 (2012) (describing the administrative duties of the Secretary
of the Navy). The military often uses outdated terminology to refer to these Title 10 functions
as “man, train, and equip.” I intentionally use the gender-neutral term “staffing” to better
reflect the important role that women play in the Armed Forces and the current “no
exceptions” combat policy.
23 See infra Parts II.B–C, III. This definition is derived from (1) Article I of the
Constitution; (2) statutes addressing the roles and responsibility of the Secretaries of the
Military Departments; and (3) the law of the chain of command and military doctrine to
include administrative control.
24 See infra Parts II.B–C, III.
25 See infra Part III.
26 See Niall McCarthy, The World’s Biggest Employers, FORBES (June 23, 201 5, 8:20 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2015/06/23/the-worlds-biggest-employersinfographic/#104f459c686b (“[T]he US Department of Defense boasts a workforce of 3.2
million people, making it the largest global employer.”).
27 Forest L. Reinhardt & Michael W. Toffel, Managing Climate Change: Lessons from the
U.S. Navy, HARV. BUS. REV. July/Aug. 2017, at 104 (describing one of the fundamental
purposes of the Navy is to “maintain . . . forces capable of winning wars”). “Military
organizations are idiosyncratic and special. Their primary ‘output’ is lethal force, controlled
in ways that compel people to do what they don’t want to do. No legitimate firm does anything
remotely comparable.” Id. The DoD mission statement states that it “shall maintain and use
armed forces to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic; [e]nsure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the
United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest; [u]phold and advance the
national policies and interests of the United States.” DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF DEF. DIR.
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questions: How is this agency designed? Does the governing agency
design strengthen or undermine civilian control of the military?
How is the DoD—as a federal agency—subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and how are its actions subject to judicial
review?
The answer lies with a fuller understanding of DoD’s unique and
complex agency design that allocates power within the
government’s largest agency.28 Consider the following examples:
Militarization of Foreign Policy. The existing legal architecture
establishes a set of richly resourced and permanent geographic
combatant commanders stationed overseas that are the heart of the
operational military.29 They remain busy in war and peace.30 These
commands reside throughout the world with personnel and
resources far outpacing the State Department’s size and budget.31
Not only do these combatant commanders plan and fight the

5100.01: FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS (Dec. 21,
2010).
28 For a discussion of the importance of agency design and the allocation of power within
agencies, see Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120
YALE L. J. 1032, 1057 (2011); see also Robert Knowles, Warfare as Regulation, 74 WASH. &
LEE. L. REV 1953, 1955 (2017) (arguing that the U.S. government’s national security activities
are a form of regulatory action); Matthew Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age
of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289, 290–91 (2012) (describing the traditional national security
scholarship focus). Understanding the DoD’s agency design helps answer the question: where
does all the money go? See, e.g., Craig Whitlock & Bob Woodward, Pentagon Buries Evidence
of $125 billion in Bureaucratic Waste, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2016, at A1 (“The Pentagon has
buried an internal study that exposed $125 billion in administrative waste in its business
operations amid fears Congress would use the findings as an excuse to slash the defense
budget . . . .”).
29 See ANDREW FEICKERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42077, THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN
AND COMBATANT COMMANDS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1–3 (2013) (outlining
the provisions of the Unified Command plan which allows the DoD to create and maintain
the functional combatant commands and the geographic combatant commands).
30 See id. at 25 (noting, for example, that the U.S. Transportation Command is charged to
provide transportation services regardless of whether it is peacetime or wartime).
31 See RONAN FARROW, WAR ON P EACE: THE END OF DIPLOMACY AND THE DECLINE OF
AMERICAN INFLUENCE 292 (2018) (noting that the U.S. State Department spent about $666
million on public diplomacy abroad in one recent year). The Trump Administration sought a
9.4% increase in the FY2018 DoD’s budget and a 30% decrease in the State Department
budget. See Robbie Gramer, Dan De Luce, & Colum Lynch, How the Trump Administration
Broke
the
State
Department,
FOREIGN
POLICY
(Jul.
31,
2017)
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/31/how-the-trump-administration-broke-the-statedepartment/ (“[T]he administration drafted up plans to slash State and foreign aid funding
and to let go of top career professionals . . . .”).
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nation’s wars, but they are taking on an increasing role in foreign
policy.32
Imbalance in Congressional Testimony. Each year, congressional
committees with military oversight responsibilities hear testimony
from civilian and uniformed military leadership.33 The uniformed
geographic combatant commanders—the heads of the operational
military—are normally required to testify before Congress just once
a year, and the nature of their testimony is qualitatively different:
they often seek increased funding and resources.34 In contrast, the
administrative military leaders testify in front of Congress in far
greater numbers, and are more likely to be called to the
congressional carpet whenever there is a scandal, regardless of its
nature.35
Congressional Funding. Each year, Congress passes the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a massive funding bill that
serves as a yearly litmus test for determining congressional
priorities over the DoD.36 This funding bill is heavily focused on the

32 See Edward Marks, Rethinking the Geographic Combatant Commands, 1 INTERAGENCY
JOURNAL 19, 19–20 (2010) (“[T]he military services have increasingly become the default
option for U.S. government action and response.”).
33 See, e.g., HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, 116TH CONG., Rules of the Committee on
Armed Services, https://armedservices.house.gov/committee-rules#B503BFCA-B011-4BA0A5DF-1786995BCC5F (noting the process for receiving testimony from individuals called
before the committee).
34 See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 1 (“All Combatant Commanders testify to the Armed
Services Committees on an annual basis about their posture and budgetary requirements . .
. .”). The combatant commanders normally testify just once a year via “posture statements.”
See generally PATRICK J. MURPHY & MARK MILLEY, 114TH CONG., A STATEMENT ON THE
POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 2016 (2016), https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/
rv7/aps/aps_2016.pdf.
35 For example, in the recent mishap involving a ship collision in the Navy’s Seventh Fleet,
the heads of the administrative military were called before Congress. See Robert Faturechi
et al., Years of Warnings, then Death and Disaster: How the Navy Failed its Sailors,
PROPUBLICA (Feb. 7, 2019) https://features.propublica.org/navy-accidents/us-navy-crashesjapan-cause-mccain/. Indeed, “Congress regularly calls the Service Secretary or Service Chief
on the carpet when investigating the latest acquisition foibles, even though they are not in
the acquisition management chain of command.” CLARK A. MURDOCK ET AL., BEYOND
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS: U.S. GOVERNMENT AND DEFENSE REFORM FOR A NEW STRATEGIC ERA
94 (2005).
36 See Nick Schifrin, What’s in the Defense Authorization Act, PBS NEWS HOUR (Aug. 13,
2018, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/whats-in-the-defense-authorization-act (“[The
NDAA] is also a Congressional expression of concern and even a means of restraint . . . .”).
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administrative military while granting the operational military
considerably greater discretion over spending.37
Special Operations and the Rise of “Secret Wars.” U.S. Special
Operations Forces today function as part of a super combatant
command.38 They operate almost everywhere—in 138 nations of the
world in 2016.39 They now shoulder the bulk of U.S. military’s
casualties.40 As they are employed in new ways— including covert
actions that are purposely kept out of the public eye—congressional
oversight has lagged.41 Congress has facilitated their rise with an
increased budget, personnel, and legal authorities without a
corresponding increase in oversight.42
The Operational/Administrative Disconnect. The two-military
divide also creates a practical problem: too often the administrative

37 For example, the NDAA focuses on core aspects of the administrative military (health
care, administration, personnel, etc). In the FY18 NDAA, there are 47 titles covering 740
pages addressing a wide variety of DoD activities. Of the 47 titles, only five address in any
meaningful way operational military matters as defined earlier. See generally National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, H.R. 2810, 115th Cong. (2017).
38 Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is the only military command specifically
established by Congress. See 10 U.S.C. § 167(a) (2012) (“[T]he President, through the
Secretary of Defense, shall establish under section 161 of this title, a unified combatant
command for special operations forces . . . .”).
39 See, e.g., Nick Turse, American Special Ops Forces Have Deployed to 70 Percent of the
World’s
Countries
in
2017,
THE
NATION
(June
26,
2017)
https://www.thenation.com/article/american-special-ops-forces-have-deployed-to-70-percentof-the-worlds-countries-in-2017/.
40 See Dave Phillips, Special Operations Troops Top Casualty List as U.S. Relies More on
Elite Forces, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/navy-sealwilliam-ryan-owens-dead-yemen.html
41 See Nick Turse, Special Operations Forces Continue to Expand Across the World
– Without
Congressional
Oversight,
THE
NATION
(July
17,
2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/special-operations-forces-continue-expand-across-worldwithout-congressional-oversight/ (noting that “unless they end in disaster, most missions
remain in the shadows, unknown to all but a few Americans”). Covert action is defined as
“[a]n activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic,
or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e) (Supp, II
2015) (emphasis added).
42 During the recent military tragedy in Niger and Mali, where four U.S. special forces
personnel were killed, Senators Schumer (D-NY) and Graham (R-SC), both charged with
military oversight, professed ignorance about the fact that the U.S. military was even present
in that part of the world. See Dionne Searcey & Eric Schmitt, In Niger, Where U.S. Troops
Died, a Lawless and Shifting Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2017, at A5 (quoting Senator
Graham as stating, “[w]e don’t know exactly where we’re at in the world, militarily, and what
we’re doing”).
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military provides the operational military with the wrong “stuff.”43
Or it provides equipment that the operational military does not
want or need at significant taxpayer expense.44
In Part II, I propose this new two-military analytical framework.
This Part begins with a brief historical overview of the dual-military
state and argues that these two militaries coexisted in some form
since the nation’s founding, grew further apart following World War
II and the National Security Act, and effectively separated following
the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.
Part III analyzes the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This Act,
largely unexamined by existing legal scholarship, establishes the
lawful civil-military chain of command, critical to ensuring objective
civilian control of the military. Under the DoD’s agency design, the
civilian Secretaries of the military departments are effectively
relegated to a secondary role as the heads of the administrative
military, in support of the uniformed military combatant
commanders.45 The operational military commanders, in turn, are
increasingly
delegated
broader
war-making
authorities,
accelerating independent executive action at the expense of
congressional oversight.46
Part IV addresses the two-military divide’s consequences, many
unintended. Adrian Vermeule, David Dyzenahus, and other
scholars have described the emergence of aptly named “black holes”
43 See, e.g., Marcus Weisgerber, Slow and Steady is Losing the Defense Acquisition Race,
GOV’T EXEC. (Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.goveexec.com/magazine/features/2014/11/slow-andsteady-losing-defense-acquisition-race/ (stating that an October poll “found more than 25
percent of Defense personnel were not at all confident that the acquisition process provides
the military services with the weapons they need”).
44 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates struggled mightily to provide armored vehicles to the
operational military during the heaviest fighting in Afghanistan, but he ran up against
administrative military headwinds that fought his requests at every turn. Ultimately, even
Gates was forced to work around the Goldwater-Nichols-designed bureaucracy that he was
leading. See ROBERT GATES, DUTY: MEMOIRS OF A SECRETARY OF WAR 25, 120–23 (2014)
(chronicling the administrative difficulties Gates faced in providing armored vehicles to
operational forces).
45 See 10 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2012) (“[T]he Secretaries of the military departments shall
assign specified forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands
. . . to perform missions assigned to those commands.”). Within joint doctrine, the critical term
“forces” is defined broadly. See DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 126.
46 Harold Koh has stated that in matters of national security, the Executive Branch action
“nearly always wins” due to a combination of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence,
and judicial deference. HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 137–46 (1990).
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and “grey holes” and their effects on administrative law governance
during times of war and emergency.47 Such holes serve as legal trap
doors that exempt or modify oversight over certain agency actions
depending on external factors.48 But there are also internal factors
unique to DoD and its organizational design—what I refer to as
“institutional holes”—where administrative law may or may not
apply. And within these institutional holes, governmental actions
are often shrouded in secrecy—itself a form of regulation.49
Part V addresses several independent accelerants of this twomilitary divide. Finally, Part VI provides initial recommendations
with an eye toward strengthening civilian control of the operational
military and reforming national security governance. A brief
conclusion follows.
II. FROM THE NATION’S FOUNDING TO THE COLD WAR: THE TWO
MILITARIES’ ORIGINS
Despite being hailed as a critical component and legacy of the
U.S. constitutional system, the phrase “civilian control of the
military” is wholly absent from the Constitution’s text.50 Indeed,
civilian control of the military is best understood as a longstanding
constitutional norm that can only be gleaned from the
Constitution’s text—in particular, from its placement of an elected
civilian President as head of the Army and Navy.51 Today, civilian
control of the military is implemented via governing statutes,
particularly the Goldwater-Nichols Act.52 This reinforces civilian

47 DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A T IME OF EMERGENCY 2
(2006); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1132
(2009).
48 The term legal “black hole” was first used to describe the inapplicability of law to
Guantanamo Bay detainees in the aftermath of 9/11. See DYZENHAUS, supra note 47, at 2..
49 See id; see also Vermeule, supra note 47, at 1112 (describing how the early APA
exemptions as applied to the military are “rarely litigated”).
50 See PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS 81 (2003) (discussing that civilian control of the military is implied by “the
presence of senior civilian officials in the Department of Defense”); see also Christopher M.
Bourne, Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 18 JOINT FORCES QUART. 99,
100 (1998) (discussing the phrase “civilian control of the army”).
51
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
52 See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986) (stating the purpose of the Act is to “strengthen civilian authority
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control of the military through the formation of a lawful chain of
command that subordinates the military to civilian oversight.53
A. THE TWO-MILITARY GLOSSARY AND OVERVIEW OF KEY TERMS

Before I dive into the history and particulars of the DoD’s legal
architecture, we begin with a brief glossary of the relevant terms.
The following five key terms in particular are essential to
understanding the two-military state. These definitions can be
traced to existing law, regulation, or doctrine.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS): By law, the CJCS
is the principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of
Defense, National Security Council, and Homeland Security
Council for all military matters including the promulgation of joint
doctrine.54 The CJCS lacks formal command authority55 but has
enormous informal authority, communicating operational military
orders to combatant and joint task force commanders. Members of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff include the uniformed “service Chiefs,” but
they lack a discrete line of communication to the President and
Secretary of Defense.56
Combatant Commanders: Within the operational military,
combatant commanders are uniformed, four-star military officers
who head one of the ten combatant commands and lead the
operational military.57 The five extraterritorial geographic
combatant commanders as well as Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) are the operational military’s true “heart.” They exercise

in the Department of Defense . . . [and] to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the
unified and specified combatant commands”).
53 Id.
54 10 U.S.C. §§ 151, 153 (2012).
55 See id. at § 153 (noting that all of the responsibilities and functions of the CJCS are
subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and Secretary of Defense).
56 See DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUBLICATION 1: DOCTRINE FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES, II-9, III-4, III-5 (as amended through Mar. 25, 2013) [hereinafter JOINT
PUBLICATION 1].
57 As of this writing, the ten combatant commands include six geographic commands: five
overseas—Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, Northern Command,
Indo-Pacific Command, and Southern Command—and four functional combatant
commands—Cyber Command, Strategic Command, Special Operations Command, and
Transportation Command. Combatant Commands, supra note 12.
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an increasingly important but not well-understood role in national
security law and governance.58
Secretaries of military departments: Within the administrative
military, these politically appointed, civilian heads of the three
military departments (Army, Navy, & Air Force) lead the
administrative military and provide oversight over the uniformed
service “chiefs.”59
Joint: “[A]ctivities, operations, organizations, etc., in which
elements of two or more military departments participate.”60
B. THE EXECUTIVE-OPERATIONAL NEXUS AND CONGRESSIONALADMINISTRATIVE NEXUS61

The operational military has existed in some capacity since our
nation’s founding.62 Its primary legal authority can be found within
the text of the Constitution, particularly in the Commander in Chief
clause: “[T]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual service of the United States.”63
The precise scope of this authority has befuddled scholars and
jurists since the Constitution’s inception.64 Despite its clear modern58 See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 1 (noting that the combatant commands are the
“embodiment of U.S. policy both at home and abroad”).
59 Under existing law, the Marine Corps is part of the Department of the Navy. 10 U.S.C.
§ 5061 (2012); see also HEIDI M. PETERS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R7-5700, DEFENSE PRIMER:
THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 1–2 (updated Nov. 28, 2018) (reviewing the composition of the
three military departments, how they were appointed, and their oversight of chiefs).
60 DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 283.
61 Broadly speaking, Congress has the constitutional power of the “purse” while the
executive has the power of the “sword.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The
Executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the community. The
legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and
rights of every citizen are to be regulated.”).
62 See ROBERT K. WRIGHT, THE CONTINENTAL ARMY 10–12, 23 (1983) (stating that the First
Continental Congress rejected the idea of creating a national militia force, but the Second
Continental Congress did establish a Continental Army in 1775). Both the Continental Army
and Continental Navy existed prior to the ratification of the Constitution. See, e.g., Mark P.
Nevitt, Unintended Consequences: The Posse Comitatus Act in the Modern Era, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 119, 161 (2014) (stating that the Continental Navy was founded in 1775 and the Coast
Guard was founded in 1790).
63 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
64 Justice Jackson famously stated, “A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised
at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of
executive power as they actually present themselves. Just what our forefathers did envision,
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day importance for defining the scope of operational military
matters, the clause was not discussed during the Constitutional
Convention.65 While the exact breadth and scope of this authority
are not without limit, it has been consistently understood to include
the authority to command and control military operations.66 While
a comprehensive review of the President’s powers as Commander in
Chief is beyond the scope of this Article, two views emerged during
the nation’s founding that are particularly relevant to the modern
military divide.
The first view, held by Anti-Federalists and Thomas Jefferson,
reflected an abiding faith in citizen-militias and possessed a
profound suspicion of federal standing armies.67 The second view,
shared by the Federalists and Alexander Hamilton, favored
centralization, envisioned the young nation’s need for standing
armies and navies, and favored more streamlined authority and
rapid executive action.68 In The Federalist Papers, Hamilton wrote
that the authority of the Commander in Chief “would amount to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first [g]eneral and admiral of the
[c]onfederacy.”69 Hamilton stated that the Commander in Chief had
the authority over the tactical movement of troops and vessels,

or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from
materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for
Pharaoh.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
65 See generally, Documents from the Continental Congress and Constitutional Convention,
1774 to 1789, LIBRARY OF CONG.: DIGITAL COLLECTIONS https://www.loc.gov/collections/
continental-congress-and-constitutional-convention-from-1774-to-1789/about-this-collection/
(last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (not discussing the Commander in Chief clause in any of the
documents preserved from the Constitutional Convention).
66 See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850) (stating that the Commander-in-Chief
power is “purely military”).
67 See Earl F. Martin, America’s Anti-Standing Army Tradition and the Separate
Community Doctrine, 76 MISS. L.J. 135, 180 (2006) (“[T]he Anti-Federalists generally held
the idea of a national standing army in contempt, while bestowing praise upon the citizen
militia.”).
68 See ROBERT CHERNOW, HAMILTON 253–60 (2004); Goldwater-Nichols Hearing, supra
note 15, at 36 (statement of Jim Thomas, Vice-President and Director of Studies, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) (“The way we do command and control in the
American military is exceptional . . . . [W]e have had a tension, since the founding of the
Republic, between a Jeffersonian aversion to . . . the concentration of power in any military
officer versus the Hamiltonian impulse toward centralization and effectiveness.”).
69 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
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foreshadowing doctrinal authorities integral to the modern
operational military.70
This authority was understood to authorize the President to take
command of the troops in the field; indeed, President Washington
once did just that, personally commanding militia forces in the
Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.71 This authority also found support in
the Supreme Court. In 1850, Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the
Court in Fleming v. Page, emphasized the President’s tactical
command over military forces during military operations: “As
commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the
naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to
employ them in the manner he may deem effectual to harass and
conquer and subdue the enemy.”72
The earliest views of the Commander in Chief’s authority as the
tactical and operational leader of the armed forces live on in the
operational military’s definition and in modern legal and doctrinal
authorities. In contrast, the administrative military’s origins are
more closely aligned with congressional authorities within the
Constitution’s text.73 At the time of the Constitutional Convention,
the issue of standing armies (where they should come from—states
or federal—and who should control them) was hotly debated.74
Under the Constitution’s text, Congress controls all military
appropriations which include the “power of the purse” and oversight
over the DoD’s annual budget.75 Congress also has the power to
“declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Id.
See Nigel Anthony Sellars, Treasonous Tenant Farmers and Seditious Sharecroppers:
The 1917 Green Corn Rebellion Trials, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1097, 1104 (2002) (discussing
President George Washington’s role in the Whiskey Rebellion).
72 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850) (emphasis added).
73 The preamble of the Constitution foreshadows the modern military’s mission when it
states its goal as “to form a more perfect Union . . . and [to] provide for the common Defence.”
U.S. CONST. pmbl. Further, Congress “provide[s] for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1.
74 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining how the proposition of
standing armies is problematic); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 185–86 (1996) (discussing the Anti-Federalist
view on standing armies).
75 U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 1. Each year, Congress passes the yearly National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA), an enormous piece of annual legislation that can surpass 1,000
pages. The majority of the subject matter is focused on administrative matters. See, e.g.,
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, supra note 37.
70
71
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Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”76 Congress has the
authority to “raise and support [a]rmies” (limited to two years) and
“provide and maintain a Navy” (no time limitation)77 as well as the
constitutional authority to make regulations governing the Armed
Forces.78 In addition, under the Constitution’s Militia clauses,
Congress has the power “to provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel
Invasions”79 and the power “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may
be employed in the Service of the United States.”80
Although neither the Federalists nor the anti-Federalists could
have anticipated the modern military’s massive size, their
competing visions continue to play out in the two-military divide.
Indeed, the seeds for a two-military division were sown from the
nation’s founding. For example, the Hamiltonian vision of a
centralized, effective, and efficient Executive and military is best
reflected in the operational military with its comparably shorter
chain of command and efficiency while the anti-Federalist vision of
a more diffuse, de-centralized power structure lives on in the
administrative military.
The size of the military waxed and waned throughout American
history until the end of World War II.81 Standing armies became a
permanent fixture with the emergence of the Cold War, and the
National Security Act of 1947 created the modern military
infrastructure, discussed below.82
C. THE TWO MILITARIES’ STATUTORY ORIGINS: THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT (1947) AND THE RISE OF STANDING ARMIES AND NAVIES

The National Security Act of 1947 established the modern
national security organizational structure and core institutions that
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 11.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–13. See generally Dakota Rudesill, The Land and Naval
Forces Clauses, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 391 (2018).
78 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
81 See DEP’T OF DEF., SELECTED MANPOWER STATISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 1997 46–51, tbl. 211 (1997) (displaying the number of American active duty military personnel in all recorded
years from 1789 to 1997).
82 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 253, 61 Stat. 495.
76
77
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continue in some form to this day.83 Specifically, it created the
National Military Establishment (now the DoD), Central
Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and the Secretary
of Defense.84 It also established the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, ensuring civilian oversight over the entire military
apparatus (operational and administrative), bringing all three
services (Army, Navy, Air Force) under the Secretary of Defense’s
auspices.85 The law’s passage coincided with a massive and
continual standing Army for the first time in American history,
forever changing the allocation of power between Congress and the
President.86
The National Security Act also demoted the Secretaries of the
Army and Navy from Cabinet officials to a military department
head, and created the Air Force as a new military department—an
outgrowth of the Army Air Corps.87 And in establishing a single
Cabinet-level Secretary of Defense over all the services, it sought to
solve a problem that persisted throughout World War II: interservice
rivalry
that
undermined
operational
military
effectiveness.88 During World War II, the uniformed heads of the
Army and Navy possessed both administrative and operational
authorities, but the services were often at loggerheads with one
another.89 While ultimately successful in Allied victory, the Army
and Navy failed to seamlessly conduct joint Navy and Army
operations throughout the war.90 As President Truman declared,

83 Id. at § 201 (establishing the National Military Establishment as headed by the
Secretary of Defense)
84 Id. at § 101–03 (setting forth the parameters of the creation of each institution listed).
85 See OMAR N. BRADLEY & CLAY BLAIR, A GENERAL'S LIFE 466 (1983) (explaining the office
of Secretary of Defense and its control over all three Services). In 1949, two years later, the
term “National Military Establishment” was changed to the Department of Defense. Id.
86 See DEP’T OF DEF., SELECTED MANPOWER STATISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 1997, supra note 81,
at 51–53 (showing that the standing army consisted of approximately 1.5 million soldiers in
1947 and that the standing army grew in the following decades).
87 For roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Air Force, see 10 U.S.C. § 8013
(2012).
88 See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 10 (explaining the problem of inter-service rivalries in
World War II).
89 For example, Admiral Nimitz served as the head of the Navy in the Pacific Fleet in the
Northern Pacific and General MacArthur served as head of the Army in the Southern Pacific.
Joint, unified military operations were virtually non-existent in the Pacific theater. See id.
90 See id. (“Differences between the Army and Navy precluded any sort of unified command
arrangement . . . .”).
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“[w]e must never fight another war the way that we fought the last
two. I have a feeling if the Army and Navy had fought our enemies
as hard as they fought each other, the war would have ended much
earlier.”91
For this reason, the National Security Act placed the three
military services under the direction, authority, and control of one
civilian Secretary of Defense.92 A civilian served as the Secretary of
each military department with a senior uniformed “service chief”
reporting to each Secretary.93 The National Security Act also formed
the early infrastructure for the modern military organization where
civilian Secretaries of the military departments, in theory, provide
the forces under the unified strategic direction of the combatant
command.94
Following the National Security Act’s passage, President
Eisenhower sought to further increase the power of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and tightened civilian control of the military
with follow-on reform efforts in 1953 and 1958.95 But despite
Truman and Eisenhower’s efforts to reduce inter-service rivalry and
improve defense acquisitions efficiency, the core problems of interservice rivalry remained unresolved.96

Id.
50 U.S.C. § 3002 (2012).
93 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 5013 (2012) (explaining that the Secretary of the Navy is
“appointed from civilian life”).
94 See 50 U.S.C. § 3002 (2012) (providing for the civilian Secretaries of Military
Departments). For example, the Department of the Navy is defined as:
[T]he Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the
headquarters United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of
the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United
States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all
field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities and
functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy;
and the United States Coast Guard when operating as part of the Navy
pursuant to law.
50 U.S.C. § 3004 (2012).
95 See Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, 18 F.R. 3743, 67 Stat. 638 (providing greater
management flexibility to the Secretary of Defense); Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-599, 63 Stat. 579 (authorizing the President, acting through the
Secretary of Defense with the advice of the JCS, to establish unified or specified commands,
assign missions, and determine their force structure).
96 See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 5 (noting that there were numerous later instances of
poor inter-service planning and cooperation which led to failed missions).
91
92
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Indeed, this legal architecture remained in place throughout the
Cold War and the Vietnam War.97 The civilian leadership and
Secretary of Defense exercised considerable control over the
military throughout the 1960s and the Vietnam War.98 Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara famously brought in data-driven
“Whiz Kids” to the Pentagon.99 And President Johnson and
McNamara were intimately involved in operational decisionmaking throughout the Vietnam War.100 The CJCS did not regularly
advise the President on military matters; he only met with the
President twice before the introduction of ground troops in
Vietnam.101 Commentators have argued that the absence of routine
military advice led to military disaster.102 Indeed, it was not
uncommon for President Johnson and Secretary McNamara to
make targeting and tactical military decisions—such decisions
were, historically, made by military commanders in the field.103
Following the Vietnam War, the individual services were still
king. They possessed enormous power and influence both in
administrative and operational matters.104 Each service continued
to exercise both operational and administrative control over their
respective forces: Navy admirals continued to command ships,
aircraft carriers and sailors, and Army generals commanded Army
brigades, tank and infantry battalions and soldiers.105 Seldom did
Navy admirals command Army soldiers and vice versa.106 Joint,
97 See id. at 4–5 (noting how the structure of the commands has changed since the mid1940s through the 1980s, covering the period of the Vietnam War and the Cold War).
98 See H.R. MCMASTER, DERELICTION OF DUTY 14 (1997) (discussing how the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958 “aimed to centralize control over the services, remove
redundancies, streamline command channels, and provide for tighter civilian control at the
Pentagon”).
99 Id. at 2.
100 Id. at 53–55. And they have been heavily criticized for their involvement. Id. at 54–55.
101 See id. at 217–42.
102 See Robert K. Brigham, Opinion, Lyndon Johnson vs. the Hawks, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 29,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/opinion/lyndon-johnson-vietnam-senate.html.
103 But not entirely, President Lincoln, for example, was intimately involved in military
tactical decision-making during the Civil War. For a discussion of this civil-military dynamic,
see generally id.
104 See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 4–5 (stating that from the National Security Act of 1947
until the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, commanders of each service
were delegated full operational control over their forces).
105 Id.
106 See id. (noting that once forces were assigned to certain commanders, control of those
forces could only be transferred with Presidential approval).
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multi-service warfare was simply not a reality between 1947 and
1986, harming operational military effectiveness. Each military
service, in effect, was still “king” in joint, unified warfare. The
combatant commands’ operational authorities and the efficacious
joint warfare had to wait until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to
be fully realized.107
III. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986 ACCELERATES THE
OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MILITARY DIVIDE
A casual observer may chalk up today’s relative lack of civilian
oversight over the operational military to an underlying tactical and
technological problem: the military needs to be poised for a swift
response in the face of fast-paced and complex threats facing the
nation (cyber, transnational terrorism, etc.). That is not irrelevant,
but there is more to it. The statutory regime adopted in 1986 which
attempted to improve military operational effectiveness and to
reduce inter-service rivalry, created a structure that further
isolated the operational military from oversight.
The concepts of command and control are of central importance
for the military and define how the DoD allocates power within the
agency. Under joint military doctrine, “command” is defined as
“[t]he authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully
exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.”108
Command is “the most important role undertaken by a [joint force
commander]”109 and includes “[a]n order given by a commander;
that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of
bringing about a particular action.”110 Control is a lesser authority.

107 In his last years in office, President Eisenhower sought to build upon the National
Security Act reforms. He somewhat succeeded. The DoD Reorganization Act of 1958
established a clear line of command from the President through the Secretary of Defense to
the combatant commands. See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 5.
108 JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at GL-5. Under military doctrine, command and
control is “[t]he exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.” Id.
109 Id. at xxii; see FEAVER, supra note 50, at 82–83 (noting that Congress may have “viewed
the newly strengthened Joint Staff as creating yet another fire alarm”). “[U]nity of command”
is defined as “[t]he operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the
requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose.” DOD
DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 252.
110 DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 40.
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It includes “[a]uthority that may be less than full command
exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate
or other organizations.”111
In the traditional employer-employee context at other federal
agencies, command and control have far different meanings. Most
agency and civil service employees serve within that particular
agency’s human resource rules and can be hired, fired, and
disciplined accordingly. In contrast, the DoD is governed by a vast
hierarchical structure that exerts a more coercive effect on its
members: failing to obey a military supervisor’s order could result
in criminal prosecution.112 There is simply no corollary in the
civilian world or at other federal agencies.
This Part describes and analyzes the Goldwater-Nichols Act,
focusing on its modification of command and control authorities. In
the terminology of Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn, GoldwaterNichols possesses certain “super-statute” qualities within the halls
of the Pentagon.113 Although it has yet to achieve similar superstatute appreciation outside the DoD, its effect on the DoD and its
implications for civilian control of the military are enormous—
further underscoring why Goldwater-Nichols merits the status as a
“super-statute.”
A. THE LAW OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE RISE OF THE
OPERATIONAL MILITARY AND THE (RELATIVE) FALL OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE MILITARY114

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was born from the ashes of military
operational failures.115 In addition to the tragedy of the Vietnam
War, the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt contributed to
JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at GL-6.
See 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012) (stating that “failure to obey order or regulation” is a
punishable offense).
113 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216
(2001) (noting that a super-statute tries to create a new institutional framework that impacts
the public culture and has an extensive effect on the law).
114 “Relative” is placed in parenthesis on purpose—the administrative military yields
enormous power in the acquisitions process and the development of equipment and weaponry.
See infra Part IV.D (arguing that the dual-military creates issues in the administrative
military’s ability to equip the operational military).
115 See KATHLEEN MCINNIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44474, GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AT 30:
DEFENSE REFORM AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2016) (describing the military history and
failures leading up to the passage of the Act).
111
112
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President Carter’s electoral defeat to President Reagan in 1980.116
It also exposed the DoD’s inability to conduct joint, inter-service
military operations.117 Inter-service rivalry was not just a
bureaucratic fight over funding, status, and influence—it was
costing American lives.118
The Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to address all of these
concerns by reducing inter-service rivalry and streamlining civilian
authority within the Department.119 Like a weary parent tired of
sibling rivalry and bickering, Congress finally stepped in to make
the services get along and work together.120
After years of debate and significant pushback from the
Pentagon, Congress passed the bipartisan Goldwater-Nichols Act in
1986, named after Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), a World War II
veteran and 1964 Republican Presidential nominee and
Representative Mike Nichols (D-AL), another highly decorated
veteran.121 Passed in the shadow of earlier operational military
failures, supporters of the Act hoped to strengthen civilian control
over the military, improve military operational effectiveness,
streamline the costly and lengthy acquisitions process, and lessen
inter-service rivalry through a focus on joint warfare and
doctrine.122 Specifically, Goldwater-Nichols was intended to:
[S]trengthen civilian authority in the Department . . .
improve the military advice provided to the President,
the National Security Council, and the Secretary of
116 See JAMES LOCHNER, VICTORY ON THE POTOMAC 30–31 (Joseph G. Dawson III et al. eds.,
2002) (describing the fall of President Carter and the election of President Regan).
117 See MCINNIS, supra note 115, at 3 (describing the effects of the hostage rescue).
118 See id. (showing that the lack of cohesiveness led to failed missions and casualties).
119 See id. at 6–8 (stating the aims of the Act).
120 See id. (noting the Act’s goal to encourage cohesiveness between the Military
Departments).
121 See LOCHNER, supra note 116, at 96, 211, 217, 420–28 (offering an overview of the
legislative history on the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s passage). Senator Goldwater served as a
Major General in the U.S. Air Force Reserves until his retirement from service. Id. at 213.
122 See MCINNIS, supra note 115, at 7–8 (discussing the purposes of the passage of the Act).
In a staff report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, four key "indicators of
organizational deficiencies” for the period preceding Goldwater-Nichols were meticulously
catalogued. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 99TH CONG., DEFENSE ORGANIZATION: THE
NEED FOR CHANGE 15 (Comm. Print 1985). The four indicators include: (1) operational
failures and deficiencies; (2) acquisition process deficiencies; (3) lack of strategic direction;
and (4) poor inter-Service coordination. Id.
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Defense . . . [and] place clear responsibility on the
commanders of the unified and specified combatant
commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned
to those commands.123
Yet Senator Goldwater’s own views at the outset of the hearing
to reform the DoD called into question the continuing importance of
civilian control of the American military:
The question is, can we, as a country, any longer afford
a 207-year old concept that in military matters the
civilian is supreme? . . . Now, I realize the sanctity of
the idea of the civilian being supreme. It is a beautiful
thing to think about. The question in my mind is, can
we any longer afford to allow the expertise of [military]
men and women . . . to be set aside for the decisions of
the civilians . . . . We lost in Korea, no question about
that, because we did not let the military leadership
exercise military judgment. We lost in Vietnam . . . . If
that is the way we are going to do it in the future, I think
we are in trouble.124
The Act accomplished three main objectives, which had the effect of
empowering the operational military at the expense of the
administrative military.
First, it established two chains of command within the military,
effectively dividing it in two.125 In doing so, Goldwater-Nichols
addressed how the President commands by modifying the DoD’s
operational chain of command to flow from each combatant
commander to the Secretary of Defense to the President.126 It also
established a parallel administrative chain of command that flows
from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of

123 Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control
of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 351 (1994) (quoting Goldwater-Nichols
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-433 §3 100 Stat. 992-93 (1986)); see 10 U.S.C. § 162 (a) (2012) (“[T]he
Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to . . .
combatant commands . . . to perform missions assigned to those commands.”).
124 Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 98th Cong. 3 (1983) (statement of Sen.
Goldwater, Member, S. Comm. on Armed Servs.).
125 See 10 U.S.C. § 162(b) (2012) (describing the split in the chain of command).
126 Id. (describing the operational chain of command).
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each military department.127 Under Goldwater-Nichols, the civilian
heads of each military department possess authority and
responsibility over twelve administrative functions.128
Second, Goldwater-Nichols elevated the powers of the combatant
commanders, eliminating the civilian Secretaries of the military
departments and the uniformed service chiefs from any operational
or war-fighting function, which greatly diminished their overall
authority.129 The civilian Secretaries of the military departments
are now completely outside the operational (war-fighting) chain of
command and must support the combatant commander by
providing all forces to the operational military: “[T]he Secretaries of
the Military Departments shall assign all forces under their
jurisdiction to . . . combatant commands . . . to perform missions
assigned to those commands.”130
The administrative military departments do not truly command
any forces, although they provide a level of administrative control
consistent with their twelve statutory functions.131 In contrast, the
operational military both commands and controls.132 And under
Goldwater-Nichols, the senior uniformed combatant commanders
are “responsible to the President and to the Secretary of Defense for
the performance of missions assigned to that command by the
President or by the Secretary with the approval of the President.”133
The combatant commanders are invested with broad authority to
plan and execute the nation’s wars.134 Their roles and

127 See id. (describing an administrative chain of command involving the Military
Department Secretaries).
128 These twelve functions include: “(1) recruiting; (2) organizing, (3) supplying, (4)
equipping (includes research and development), (5) training, (6) servicing, (7) mobilizing, (8)
demobilizing, (9) administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel), (10)
maintaining, (11) the construction, outfitting and repair of military equipment, and (12) the
construction, maintenance, and repair of building, structures and utilities and the acquisition
of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities
specified in this section.” 10 U.S.C. § 5013 (b) (2012).
129 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 162 (2012) (altering the power and roles of several operational
military actors).
130 10 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
131 See 10 U.S.C. § 5013(b) (outlining the twelve statutory functions of the administrative
military department).
132 See 10 U.S.C. § 164 (2012) (describing the authority of the operational military).
133 10 U.S.C. § 164 (2012).
134 See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 1–2.
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responsibilities have expanded over the years to encompass a large
swath of non-military and foreign relations functions.135
Third, Goldwater-Nichols empowered the Office of the CJCS,
boosting its stature, responsibility, and authority.136 Under
Goldwater-Nichols, the CJCS enjoys enormous authority and
influence due to the centralization of military advice to the
President and the way that orders are promulgated and
communicated.137 This change coincided with General Colin
Powell’s service as the first post-Goldwater-Nichols Chairman.138
General Powell, a former White House Fellow and one of the first
African-American four-star generals, was a particularly influential
military officer who orchestrated the U.S. military operation in the
Persian Gulf War.139 Both Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill
Clinton revered General Powell’s advice.140 His remarkable political
and military skills greatly bolstered the power of the Chairman’s
office.141
Communications from the operational military combatant
commands are now transmitted via the Chairman, completely
bypassing the civilian service Secretaries.142 The CJCS translates
and communicates direction and operational orders up and down
the chain of command.143 These are sent to the combatant
commands and their associated operational military commanders;
many of whom are engaged in major combat operations.144 All
operational orders originate from the Joint Staff, circumventing the

See id. (describing the enlarged role of combatant commanders).
10 U.S.C. § 163(a)(1) (2012).
137 Id.
138 See
Colin
Powell
Biography,
BIOGRAPHY.COM
(Apr.
2,
2014),
https://www.biography.com/peopl/colin-powell-9445708 (“In 1989, President George H.W.
Bush appointed General Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”).
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See 10 U.S.C. § 163(a)(1) (2012) (outlining how communications from combatant
commands are transmitted). And the Joint Staff’s size and stature within DoD has grown
significantly in recent years. See LOCHNER, supra note 116, at 213.
143 See 10 U.S.C. § 163 (2012) (outlining the chain of communication for operational orders).
144 Id.
135
136
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individual service leaders.145 The Chairman and his highly qualified
staff now implement Presidential policy and direction.146
Relatedly, Goldwater-Nichols established the Chairman as the
principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense,
National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council.147 This
change serves to unify and channel the military advice provided to
civilian decision makers—it comes from one person (rather than in
a diffuse nature through the individual service chiefs). By law, the
Chairman has direct access to the President in providing military
advice and does not need to formally coordinate this advice via the
Secretary of Defense.148
Finally, combatant commands have broad delegated legal
authority to create new organizations and commands, so-called
“Joint Task Forces,” in response to an emergency, humanitarian
mission, or any other military missions.149 This takes place wholly
independent of congressional oversight.150 These Joint Task Forces
are of increased importance for ongoing military operations—such
as those in Syria and Afghanistan—with the combatant commands
taking on more of an oversight role.151 For example, General Miller
leads the U.S. task force that is part of the NATO Resolute Support
Mission in Afghanistan.152 He reports to the Central Commander,
currently General Votel.153
Id.
Failure to comply with a lawful order is a firing offense and risks courts-martial. See
Sarah Grant & Jack Goldsmith, What if President Trump Orders Secretary of Defense Mattis
to do Something Deeply Unwise?, LAWFARE (Aug. 22, 2017, 12:36 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-if-president-trump-orders-secretary-defense-mattis-dosomething-deeply-unwise.
147 10 U.S.C. § 151(b) (2012).
148 10 U.S.C. § 162(b) (2012).
149 See JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at xviii (noting how and under what authority
Joint Task Forces can be created).
150 Id. at IV-10–IV-12 (discussing the high level of discretion that the operational military
has in creating Joint Task Forces).
151 Geography plays a role in the allocation of power and authority between combatant
commands and the administrative military. Most geographic combatant commanders are
outside the United States, creating additional time-distance problems, further hindering
oversight. Cf id. (exploring the effects of geography on military oversight).
152 Jim Garamone, Miller Takes Over NATO, U.S. Command in Afghanistan, U.S. DEP’T
DEF. (Sept. 2, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1618550/miller-takes-overnato-us-commands-in-afghanistan/.
153 General Joseph L. Votel, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/
About/Biographies/Biography-View/article/602777/general-joseph-l-votel/.
145
146
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In sum, due to Goldwater-Nichols, the operational combatant
commanders’ authorities grew significantly. So, too, did the status
and power of the CJCS. The operational military commands now
have broad responsibility to plan for the employment of armed
forces, respond to military contingencies, and take actions to deter
conflict and command the military.154 The administrative military
now supports the operational military, which possesses the legal
and doctrinal authority to utilize all the breathtaking tools of
modern warfare.155
A snapshot of the evolution of the military’s chain of command is
provided in Table 1, below. Two key points demand highlighting.
First, the President and Secretary of Defense (both civilians) are in
the lawful chain of command for both militaries.156 Second, under
Goldwater-Nichols, there are three levels of civilian oversight
(President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Army, Navy, or
Air Force) within the administrative military’s chain of command,
but only two levels of civilian oversight (President and Secretary of
Defense) within the operational military’s chain of command.157 The
CJCS has direct access to the President for all military advice—this
advice has historically focused on operational military matters.158
The positions in italics indicate active-duty military personnel.
Table 1: The Law of the Chain of Command Through History

Operational
Military

1789-1947
President159

Secretary
of
War

Secretary
of
Army;

1947-1986
President

Secretary
of
Defense


1986-present
President

Secretary
of
Defense


154 10 U.S.C. § 164 (b)(3)(A)–(C) (2012) (listing the primary duties of a Commander of a
combatant command).
155 See supra Parts II.B–C, III (discussing how the operational military and administrative
military interact with each other).
156 10 U.S.C. § 162(b) (2012) (“Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of
command to a unified or specified combatant runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense.”).
157 10 U.S.C. §§ 162(b), 164(c).
158 10 U.S.C. § 151.
159 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Combatant
Commanders160

Combatant
Commanders161
(via Chairman,
Joint Staff)

President

Secretary
of
Defense

Civilian
Secretaries
of
Military
Departments

Uniformed
“Chiefs”162

President

Secretary
of
Defense

Civilian
Secretaries
of
Military
Departments163

Uniformed
“Chiefs”164

B. HOW THE LAW OF MILITARY “CONTROL” AND THE RISE OF JOINT
MILITARY DOCTRINE FURTHER DIVIDE THE TWO MILITARIES

In addition to altering the chain of command, Goldwater-Nichols
fundamentally changed the way the two militaries controlled their
forces. Control, a military authority that is “less than full
command,” defines the way the military conducts its day-to-day
activities.165 Under joint military doctrine, three of the four
command authorities pertain to the operational military

160 The forces (people, weapons, and equipment) are administratively assigned to
individual services that continue to exercise operational control over them. Cf 10 U.S.C
§164(c) (outlining the command authority of Combatant Commanders).
161 Forces are now assigned to combatant commands from the individual services. 10 U.S.C.
§ 162(a)(1) (2012). The heads of each service are not in the operational chain of command. See
generally id. at §162(b) (not specifically including the heads of each service in the operational
chain of command).
162 Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, the senior military officer in each branch of service (Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marines) exercised operational control over their individual service forces.
See discussion supra Part III.A (noting the changes that occurred after Goldwater-Nichols).
163 Following Goldwater-Nichols, the military services assigned all forces under their
jurisdiction (with limited exception) to the combatant commands. 10 U.S.C. § 162 (a) (2012).
164 See id.
165 DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 49–50.
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(combatant command, operational, and tactical).166 Just one
authority—administrative control—pertains to the administrative
military.167
As a result, the operational military has two significant lines of
control emanating from its forces: Personnel assigned to the
combatant commands have both an operational chain of command
for war-fighting and military operations that leads to the combatant
commander, as well as an administrative chain of command for
administrative matters that leads to the Secretaries of the military
departments.168 In contrast, the administrative military has just
one—administrative control.169
Goldwater-Nichols also increased the role and stature of joint
military doctrine, defined as “overarching guidance and
fundamental principles for the employment of the Armed Forces of
the United States.”170 It serves as the “bridge between policy and
doctrine and describes the authorized command relationships and
authority that military commanders can use and other operational
matters derived from [law].”171 Military doctrine is properly viewed
as the military’s day-to-day implementation guidance that is nested
within existing statute; it acts as a sort of sub-regulation, at times
with the force of law.172 If the military came with a user manual,

166 In the control context, the confusingly named “combatant command” is also a control
authority. See id. at 37 (defining “combatant command”); see also id. at 175, 234 (defining
“operational control” and “tactical control” which place both within the operational military).
167 Administrative control is inextricably linked to the statutory authority and
responsibility provided to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.
§ 5013 (2012) (defining the Secretary of the Navy’s role and responsibilities).
168 10 U.S.C. § 165(b) (2012) (“The Secretary of the Military Department is responsible for
the administration and support of forces assigned by him to a combatant command.”).
169 10 U.S.C. § 165(a) (2012) (stating that the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Military Department are responsible for
administrative control over combatant commands).
170 JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at ix. “[I]t specifies the authorized command
relationships and authority that military commanders can use, provides guidance for the
exercise of that military authority, provides fundamental principles and guidance for
command and control, prescribes guidance for organizing and developing joint forces, and
describes policy for selected joint activities. It also provides the doctrinal basis for interagency
coordination and for US military involvement in multiagency and multinational operations.”
Id. at i (emphasis added).
171 Id. at ix.
172 See DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 2 (“Joint doctrine enhances the operational
effectiveness of the Armed Forces by providing authoritative guidance and standardized
terminology on topics relevant to the employment of military forces . . . . .”).
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this would be it. The CJCS issues joint doctrine, which takes
precedence over all other doctrine to include service-specific
doctrine—yet another indication of the operational military’s
importance.173
Within joint doctrine, combatant command authority is the
pinnacle of military control authority, and this term can be found in
both statute and doctrine.174 Its doctrinal definition mirrors its
statutory definition to include full authority for a: “combatant
commander to perform those functions of command over assigned
forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces;
assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative
direction over all aspects of military operations.”175
“Operational control” and “tactical control,” the other two
command authorities the operational military possesses, perform
certain “stacking doll” functions that are embedded and inherent
within combatant command authority.176 Both are of significant
importance to the execution of military operations and can be traced
to the earliest interpretations of the Commander in Chief
authority.177 Operational control is defined as:
the authority to perform those functions of command
over subordinate forces involving organizing and
employing commands and forces, assigning tasks,
designating objectives, and giving authoritative
direction over all aspects of military operations and
joint training necessary to accomplish the mission. . . it
does not . . . include authoritative direction for logistics
or matters of administration, discipline, internal
organization or unit training.178

JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at VI-3.
See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 164(c) (2012) (discussing combat command with respect to several
areas).
175 DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 37 (emphasis added).
176 See discussion supra Part II (discussing tactical and operational control).
177 See, e.g., Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850) (noting that the Commander in Chief
has the power to employ the military placed by law at his command and direct their
movements).
178 JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at GL-10.
173
174
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Similarly, tactical control is inherent in both combatant command
and operational control. It is defined as “[authority] . . . that is
limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or
maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish
missions or tasked assigned.”179
Contrast these three control authorities of the operational
military with the single control authority—administrative control—
that the administrative military possesses by virtue of the
administrative chain of command. Administrative control is closely
linked to the statutory authority placed in the civilian military
service secretaries, and defined as:
Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or
other organizations in respect to administration and
support, including organization of Service forces,
control of resources and equipment, personnel
management, logistics, individual and unit training,
readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and
other matters not included in the operational missions
of the subordinate or other organizations.180
To highlight this division and the importance of control, consider
the hypothetical of a Navy aircraft carrier with 5,000 military
service members assigned to European Command. The European
operational commander has broad authority to position the aircraft
carrier throughout an enormous Area of Responsibility from the
Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea in response to a crisis, or
however he or she sees fit. The administrative military with its
separate chain of command, by contrast, exercises more limited
control over the sailors onboard the aircraft carrier for training,
personnel management, health care, and other ministerial matters.
Table 2 presents a snapshot of the law of control for both the
operational and administrative militaries.

Id. at GL-11–GL-12.
Id. at V-12 (as amended through Mar. 2013). Four of the statutory functions are
explicitly found in doctrine, to include equipping, training, mobilizing, and servicing. Other
functions are found implicitly (e.g. administering, logistics). Id.
179

180
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Table 2: The Hierarchy of Military Control
Operational Military
Combatant Command

Authority

Operational Control

Tactical Control

Administrative Military
Administrative Control

Individual Service Control

In sum, Goldwater-Nichols increased the operational
effectiveness of the military, streamlined the chain of command,
and generated a revolution in joint warfare.181 But it overshot in the
achievement of its goals and resulted in a weakening of civilian
control over the military through a modification of the chain of
command and a diminished role for the civilian Secretaries of the
military departments. Indeed, under Goldwater-Nichols there is
now just one civilian between the operational combatant
commanders charged with war fighting and the President.182 And
the senior uniformed military officer, the CJCS, has direct access to
the President as the principal military advisor.183
Today we have a standing army at a size unimaginable to the
founders and a vast, complex dual-military organization
continuously funded by a captured Congress.184 The operational
military now possesses a vast footprint throughout the world,
consistently funded by Congress, re-affirming its own existence.185
Inertia emerges whereby Congress cannot defund the massive
military without facing enormous political risk. After all, members

181 See supra Part III (discussing how the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act allowed for
operational and administrative efficiency).
182 See 50 U.S.C. § 3002 (2012) (placing the three Military Services under the direction,
authority, and control of one civilian Secretary of Defense). Former Secretary of Defense,
James Mattis, was head of the most powerful combatant commander (Central Command) just
four years prior to being appointed Secretary of Defense. Biography of Secretary of Defense
James N. Mattis, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/About/Biographies/BiographyView/Article/1055835/james-mattis/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
183 10 U.S.C. § 151(b) (2012).
184 See
DEP’T
OF
DEF.,
STRENGTH
COMPARISON
(DECEMBER
2018)
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp (recording that there are over 1.3
million persons in the Armed Forces as of December, 31, 2018).
185 See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 1–3.
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of Congress do not want to be accused of being “against the troops”
through the denial of funding to military members overseas.186
Finally, the DoD is best understood as an extraterritorial federal
agency. Pursuant to Goldwater-Nichols, geographic combatant
commanders, their large staffs, and subordinate commands are
permanently stationed overseas. There is not one domestic-based
military that responds to crisis abroad on a case-by-case basis.187
There are two militaries, and the operational military’s pre-existing
force structure already covers the entire globe in war, peace, and
everywhere in between. The continuation of the combatant
commander infrastructure facilitates a certain “systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
Congress and never before questioned.”188 This only empowers the
President, who can point to continued congressional acquiescence
and its continual funding of combatant commanders as “a gloss on
‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”189
IV. THE OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MILITARY DIVIDE’S
FOUR CONSEQUENCES
The two-military divide has several consequences, further
accelerated by independent factors. I focus on four of these
consequences including: (1) diminished civilian control of the
operational military, (2) militarization of foreign policy, (3) unclear
application of administrative law to the operational military, and
(4) continual bureaucratic tension between the two militaries.
As Goldwater-Nichols established two militaries with two sets of
authorities and two chains of command, congressional oversight
over the operational military has lagged.190 Congress often remains
engaged with administrative military matters, particularly defense
186 See R. Jeffrey Smith, Will Cutting the Defense Budget Leave America at Risk?, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/01/will-cuttingthe-defense-budget-leave-america-at-risk/252010/ (discussing how debates over military
spending raise fear in Americans, which are hard for politicians to navigate).
187 Cf DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 37 (defining the broad authority of control given
to combatant commanders, allowing them to respond to each perceived crisis as each sees fit).
188 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
189 Id. at 611.
190 See, e.g., Searcey & Schmitt, supra note 42, at A5 (reporting that senators are unaware
of all of the United States’ military activities around the world).
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acquisitions that can have significant impacts on employers in a
member’s home district.191 By contrast, fundamental questions
about the scope and legality of operational military operations go
unanswered.
To highlight one example, Congress passed the last two
congressional Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)
in 2001 and 2002, and each fails to include an AUMF sunset
provision or updated authorization language restricting
operations.192 In the absence of any restrictions, the operational
military continues to fill the void left behind by congressional
leadership.193 Indeed, the U.S. military is operating in an increasing
number of countries throughout the world, conducting an everexpanding menu of missions without the requisite amount of
oversight.194 The discussion below articulates how the
administrative military’s functions are increasingly aligned with
congressional interests. Congress, in turn, places too much
attention on the administrative military and not enough attention
on the operational military. Further, while administrative law and
the APA apply to the bulk of the administrative military’s actions,
it remains unclear how, precisely, it applies to the operational
military (if at all).195 This Part begins by first addressing the concept
of “civilian control of the military” and the health of this important
constitutional norm in light of the divide.

191 See James Fallows, The Tragedy of the American Military, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-americanmilitary/383516/ (“Many on Capitol Hill see the Pentagon with admirable simplicity . . . [i]t
is a way of directing tax money to selected districts.”).
192 See generally Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. (Oct. 16, 2002); Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res.
23, 107th Cong. (Sept. 18, 2001).
193 See FEICKERT supra note 29, at 14 (noting that combatant commanders can create a
Joint Task Force for a variety of reasons and that those Joint Task Forces are not disbanded
until their mission is deemed accomplished by the combatant commander).
194 See, e.g., Turse, supra note 41 (noting that Special Operations forces have grown in
every possible way from their budget to their pace of operations to the geographic sweep of
their missions since September 11, 2001).
195 See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583, 585
(2012) (noting that Congress made the deliberate decision to subject the military to review
under the APA but not explaining how this review would affect the military’s operational
activities).
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A. THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S FIRST LEGACY: CENTRALIZATION AND
DIMINISHED CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE OPERATIONAL MILITARY

1. Defining Civilian Control of the Military.
In political theory, “civilian control of the military” places
ultimate responsibility for a country’s strategic decision-making in
the hands of civilian political leadership, not professional military
officers.196 Samuel Huntington, the preeminent political theorist of
civil-military affairs, summarized civilian control as the “proper
subordination of autonomous profession to the ends of policy.”197
Civilian control of the military is better understood not as a
dichotomy but as a continual process whose strength ebbs and flows
over time due to a variety of factors.198 It fluctuates with political
norms, institutions, and personalities. That continuum can range
from “the extreme of countries ruled by military establishments, or
that experience periodic coups d’etat and frequent direct or indirect
military intervention in politics, to those that do not even possess
standing military forces.”199
The United States has a remarkably strong history of civilian
control of the military since the nation’s inception. This can be
traced to the earliest days of the Republic and George Washington’s
willingness to cede power to the Continental Congress upon his
defeat of the British Army.200 But America’s strong tradition of
civilian control is not a foregone conclusion. It requires constant
196 See FEAVER, supra note 50, at 80–81 (discussing the role of civilian principals as a
“screening mechanism” on military actions.
197 SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 72 (1959). Huntington also noted that despite numerous historical
references, a satisfactory definition of “civilian control of the military” had yet to emerge. He
divided the concept into two modes of control: subjective and objective. Subjective civilian
control maximizes “the power of civilian groups in relation to the military” via civilian
institutions and constitutional norms. Objective civilian control “professionalizes” the
military by consigning the armed forces exclusively to the apolitical task of the management
of violence. Id. at 80–85.
198 See Richard H. Kohn, An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military, AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY (Mar. 1997) http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/1997/03/an-essay-on-civiliancontrol-of-the-military/ (“The truth of the matter is that fundamentally, civilian control is not
a fact but a process.”).
199 Id.
200 See JOSEPH ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 145–46 (2004) (quoting
George Washington at the official ceremony celebrating victory as saying, “[h]aving now
finished the work assigned me . . . I retire from the great theatre of Action . . . . I here offer
my Commission, and take my leave of all the enjoyments of public life”).
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evaluation, to include weighing the relative influence “the military
and civilians have in the decisions of state concerning war, internal
security, external defense, and military affairs.”201
Within political theory, military accountability to the legislative
branch is essential to the healthy maintenance of civilian control
over the military.202 Accountability to the legislative branch, in
turn, helps ensure accountability to the civilian populace.203 This
fosters public discussion, debate, transparency in military affairs,
clarity on military expenditures, and investigation and inquiry into
military matters.204 This authority must be actively exercised,
however, lest it lie fallow, undermining civilian control.205 Strong
legislative oversight over the military actually “strengthens
national defense by reinforcing military identification with the
people and popular identification with the military.”206
Congress disproportionately exercises its authority and control
over the administrative military at the expense of operational
military oversight.207 Further, once Congress delegates power and
statutory authority to the operational military, it is difficult to get
back.208 Inertia sets in. Consider the Special Operations Command
(SOCOM), which is still the only military command formally
established by Congress by statute (pursuant to an amendment to
the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1987).209 Or consider Africa
Command, the nation’s newest geographic combatant command,

201 Kohn, supra note 198 (positing that the foundations of democratic civilian control of the
military rests on four requirements: (1) democratic governance and rule of law; (2)
accountability to public institutions; (3) effective countervailing power; and (4) a military
tradition committed to neutrality).
202 See id.
203 See id. (“Accountability to parliament or to the legislature implies accountability to the
populace.”).
204 See id.
205 See id. (“[W]here civilian control is weak or nonexistent, military influence laps over
into other areas of public policy and social life.”).
206 Id.
207 See discussion infra Part IV.A.3. (arguing that Congress actively regulates the activities
of the administrative military but not those of the operational military).
208 See, e.g., Brian McKeon & Caroline Tess, How Congress Can Take Back Foreign Policy:
A
Playbook
for
Capitol
Hill,
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
(Jan./Feb.
2019)
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-11-07/how-congress-can-takeback-foreign-policy (noting both that Congress has more authority over foreign affairs than
they are utilizing and that the ability to take it back, has been “eroded by a variety of factors”).
209 See 10 U.S.C. § 167 (2012) (establishing SOCOM).
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established in 2007.210 Since its inception, its size, scale, and
influence have grown significantly, and its headquarters staff now
exceeds European Command’s.211 Once created, bureaucracies fight
for status, funding, and influence, consistent with normal
bureaucratic behavior—the military bureaucracy and its combatant
commands are no different.212
Finally, the judiciary also has an important role in the
maintenance of civilian control of the military. Within
administrative law and § 706 of the APA, citizens can bring
individual citizen suits against agencies for violating the “arbitrary
and capricious” standard.213 But the APA has an uneven application
to the two-military divide: as discussed in greater detail below, the
administrative military is largely subject to such suits based upon
the definition of “agency,” while it remains unclear how the APA
applies to operational military actions. 214
2. Goldwater-Nichols’ Emphasis on Centralization
Goldwater-Nichols furthered the centralization of the
operational military’s power to include the streamlining of military
advice via one person: the CJCS. The CJCS now has a pivotal role
as the single voice and provider of legal advice to the President,
Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council.215 In the
operational military context, the uniformed members of the Joint
Staff are incentivized to reach a certain baseline level of consensus
in their advice to the CJCS as they lack a legal mechanism to

210 See U.S. AFRICOM Pub. Affs., U.S. Africa Command Reaches Initial Operating
Capability, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND (Oct. 1, 2007), https://www.africom.mil/mediaroom/Article/6042/us-africa-command-reaches-initial-operating-capabi
(detailing
the
creation of Africa Command).
211 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-652R: DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS:
GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS RELY ON SUBORDINATE COMMANDS FOR MISSION
MANAGEMENT AND EXECUTION 16–17 (2016) (stating that Africa Command’s headquarters
includes 1,734 persons while European Command’s headquarters includes 1,535 persons).
212 See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, ON BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO
AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989); see also WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 71–72 (1971) (suggesting that military strategy has been
driven by budget considerations).
213 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
214 See discussion infra Part IV.C.1.
215 10 U.S.C. §§ 151 (2012).
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directly advise the President and Secretary of Defense.216 As
Goldwater-Nichols discourages inter-service rivalry, the role and
importance of dissent was minimized.217 Under this centralized
model, the President and civilian decision-makers receive one voice
from the entire military on operational military matters despite an
increasingly complex menu of national security issues.218 Each
service provides their senior military officer to sit on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, but any dissent is filtered through the CJCS.219
Goldwater-Nichols also established a personnel incentive
structure where joint assignments within operational military
commands such as the Joint Staff and combatant commands are
highly sought-after and a legal prerequisite for promotion to flag
and general officer.220 Career-minded officers are competing to
“punch” a “joint ticket” within the operational military.221 Today,
the 1,000+ uniformed members of the Joint Staff may be the single
most talented and effective staff in the entire U.S. government. It is
enormously prestigious to work within the Pentagon’s corridors, due
in large part to the incentive structure established by GoldwaterNichols.222 The CJCS has the final say, too, on who joins the staff.223
The Secretaries of the military departments nominate the officers—
the CJCS ultimately selects who serves on the staff.224

216 See 10 U.S.C. § 163(a)(1) (2012) (outlining how communications from combatant
commands are transmitted).
217 Cf MCINNIS, supra note 115, at 9 (discussing that Colin Powell, the CJCS at the time,
noted the lack of dissent within Operation Desert Storm).
218 Cf id. (citing Leighton Smith, A Commander’s Perspective, in THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS
DOD REORGANIZATION ACT: A TEN-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 29, 29 (Dennis J. Quinn ed., 1999))
(stating that the White House viewed the clarification of the chain of command as
contributing to Operation Desert Storm’s success).
219 See 10 U.S.C. § 151(d) (2012) (setting forth how opinions and advice of Joint Chiefs of
Staff are to be given to the CJCS and ultimately to Washington).
220 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 662, 665 (2012) (setting forth the promotion policy objectives for joint
qualified officers and the policies for monitoring the careers of joint qualified officers).
221 See, e.g., James Joyner, Military’s Lock-Step Promotion System, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY
(Feb. 15, 2012) https://www.outsidethebeltway.com/militarys-lock-step-promotion-system/
(offering an Operation Desert Storm veteran’s view that the military promotion system for
officers involves “successfully clearing a series of hoops” including punching a “Joint ticket”).
222 See Goldwater-Nichols Hearing, supra note 15, at 35 (statement by Dr. Hamre) (“Service
chiefs are, by far, the most important people in the [Pentagon] . . . . Service Chiefs are allpowerful.”).
223 10 U.S.C. § 155(a)(2) (2012).
224 Id.
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The centralization of military advice streamlines information for
civilian decision-makers, but it also imposes institutional costs.225
As Judge Posner and Professor O’Donnell have articulated in the
context of intelligence reform, centralization reduces competition
between agencies, places an excessive focus on consensus, and less
consideration of low-probability yet high-magnitude threats.226 No
longer is inter-service rivalry the defining feature of the operational
military; unification and centralization are the defining features.227
While inter-service rivalry certainly had its costs (and still exists at
some diminished level), it has decreased dramatically since
President Truman’s earlier warnings.228 But the military has also
lost any positive and powerful counterbalancing effects from these
rivalries. Inter-service rivalry has been replaced by a single, unified
military voice and with it increased military authority and
influence.229
3. Congress Actively “Makes Rules and Regulations” for the
Administrative Military but Not the Operational Military.
As discussed in Part II, Congress has an important
constitutional role “to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”230 This is not limited
solely to the administrative land and naval Forces; it also includes
the entire defense establishment and operational military

225 See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1729 (2006) (proposing
a framework for balancing decentralization and centralization in the intelligence
community).
226 See RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN
THE WAKE OF 9/11, 42–43 (2005) (noting centralization ultimately results in depriving the
President of a range of views and incomplete data).
227 See, e.g., MCINNIS, supra note 115, at 9 (citing Colin Powell) (“You will notice in Desert
Storm nobody is accusing . . . the Army [of] fighting the Air Force and the Navy [of] fighting
the Marine Corps. We are now a team. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation helped that.”).
228 See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 3 (“Differences between the Army and Navy precluded
any sort of unified command arrangement . . . .”).
229 See Dunlap, supra note 125, at 372 (noting that rivalry between military branches has
been diminished); see also HUNTINGTON, supra note 197, at 87 (“If the officer corps . . .
[becomes more] unified . . . ,this change will tend to increase its authority with regard to other
institutions of government.”).
230 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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organization.231 While Congress exercised its constitutional
authority through the passage of the National Security Act and
Goldwater-Nichols Act, it has played a considerably more passive
role in the creation and modification of the operational military
structure.232
Under existing statutory authority and doctrine, the President
has the sole authority to create new combatant commands (and
subordinate war-fighting Joint Task Forces) without explicit
congressional approval.233 Further, the President may revise the
mission, responsibilities or force structure of an existing combatant
command independent of Congress.234 In doing so, the President
must notify Congress within 60 days, and this notification
requirement is suspended during “hostilities or imminent threat of
hostilities.”235 In turn, the combatant commander can create Joint
Task Forces and subordinate commands without congressional
approval.236
Congress is largely absent from the development of the Unified
Command Plan (UCP), the blueprint for the operational land and
naval forces that establishes and modifies the boundaries of the
geographic combatant commands. The CJCS prepares the UCP,
which has evolved to become an executive branch document signed
by the President that establishes, defines, and describes the role of
each combatant commander.237 Driving military policy and
establishing the operational military’s governing infrastructure, the
UCP implements the statutory guidance for combatant commands

231 Cf CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42699, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICE 1 (2018) (noting that some interpret the Constitution to require Congressional
authorization and approval before armed forces are deployed and utilized abroad).
232 See, e.g., Nathan Smith, Opinion, We need more congressional oversight on matters of
war, THE HILL (Apr. 24, 2018) https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/384564-we-needmore-congressional-oversight-on-matters-of-war (criticizing Congress for its lack of oversight
during the Obama and Trump administrations).
233 10 U.S.C. § 161(a) (2012).
234 10 U.S.C. § 161(b)(2) (2012).
235 Id.
236 See JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at IV-1 (Commanders of unified [Combatant
Commands] may establish subordinate unified commands . . . .”).
237 See DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 250 (defining the UCP as “[t]he document,
approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant
commanders”).
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found in the National Security Act and Goldwater-Nichols Act.238
Experts have described the UCP as a document “that has significant
impact on how [combatant commands] are organized, trained, and
resourced—areas over which Congress has constitutional
authority.”239 But its development is nested within the operational
military and executive branch with minimal input or oversight from
Congress.240 To highlight the importance of the combatant
command process, just last year a new combatant command—Cyber
Command—was established with fairly minimal public debate.241
Perhaps not surprisingly, at the time of this writing, Cyber
Command is already seeking greater operational authority to
launch offensive cyber operations.242
Moreover, while the combatant commanders provide annual
reports to Congress and testify annually, the administrative
military leaders testify in front of Congress much more
frequently.243 Indeed, not only is the frequency of administrative
military-based testimony significantly higher than operational
military commander testimony, but the purpose and nature of the
testimony is qualitatively quite different. The administrative
military is often on the receiving end of congressional investigation
and inquiry while the operational military commanders are afforded
a remarkable level of deference.244 The operational military is often
238 See id. The UCP elicits numerous questions that one would think would invite
congressional involvement, such as: Why is Israel part of European Command, not Central
Command? Why does Africa Command not include Egypt?And does Special Operations
Command’s lack of geographic restrictions—allowing it to move into and out of the myriad
geographic commands—create tension between special operators and the geographic
combatant commanders? See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 15, 28, 39 (exploring these
questions).
239 FEICKERT, supra note 29, at Summary.
240 See, e.g., Turse, supra note 39 (noting the growth of Special Operations forces since 9/11
without the oversight of Congress).
241 Lisa Ferdinando, Cybercom to Elevate to Combat Command, DOD NEWS (May 3,
2018), https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1511959/cybercom-to-elevate-tocombatant-command/.
242 See Patrick Tucker, A Fight is Brewing Between Congress and the Military Over Cyber
War, DEFENSE ONE (Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/11/fightbrewing-between-congress-and-military-over-cyber-war/142616/?oref=d-topstory
(stating
that cyber capability is progressing at a rapid pace and that the Cyber Mission Force Team
would achieve full operational capability approximately one year ahead of schedule).
243 See supra notes 34–35.
244 See MURDOCK ET AL., supra note 35 (discussing how Congress regularly calls
administrative military heads when investigating the latest military fumbles, even if the
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advocating for increased funding in that commander’s Area of
Responsibility.245 Indeed, combatant commanders’ congressional
testimony “can sway Congress and embarrass or impede the
administration.”246 To highlight one example, the four-star
combatant commander with oversight responsibilities over South
America testified in front of congressional committees seventeen
times in an attempt to advocate for increase funding for drug
interdiction efforts.247
Under a principal-agent model of civil-military relations, each
agent (military) competes with their principal (Congress or the
President) for independence and influence.248 And each geographic
combatant commander likely competes with one another for the
administrative military’s forces. After all, each Army battalion,
Navy carrier strike group, or Air Force fighter squadron can only be
in one place at one time. This sets up a dynamic whereby the
geographic combatant commands advocate strongly for their
respective regions of the world at the potential expense of other
regions. Under Goldwater-Nichols, combatant commanders enjoy a
special status within the DoD budgetary process: the Secretary of
Defense is required to submit to Congress a separate budget
proposal for each combatant command.249
Geographically, today’s operational military operates far
removed from Congress in some of the most remote parts of the
world, and operational military decision-making is much more

administrative military is not responsible or in the true operational chain of command);
FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 1 (acknowledging, in contrast, that the combatant commanders’
reports typically involve budgetary matters).
245 See, e.g., Statement of General Joseph L. Votel On the Posture of U.S. Central
Command—Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Hearing Feb. 5, 2019, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND:
POSTURE
STATEMENT,
http://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/POSTURESTATEMENT/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (thanking Congress for continual support and
asking it to continue providing the Central Command with “everything they need” to
accomplish their missions).
246 Richard Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States
Today, 55 NAVAL WAR C. REV. Summer 2002, at 17.
247 See Christoper J. Fettweis, Militarizing Diplomacy, in AMERICA’S VICEROYS 47, 53
(Derek Reveron ed., 2004) (discussing the commander’s pursuit of Congressional funding
through his numerous testimonies).
248 See generally FEAVER, supra note 50.
249 10 U.S.C. § 166 (2012).

948

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:905

likely to be classified.250 Thus, operational military commanders
have a comparative information advantage over their congressional
principles that are increasingly uninformed about operational
decision-making, leading to further bureaucratic drift. These
differences lead the administrative military, whose resource aims
are aligned with congressional interests in job creation, to compete
with the operational military for resources and funding, which is
discussed below.
Therefore, when discussing civilian control of the military, it is
important to inquire about civilian control over which military.
Operational military authorities are increasingly delegated to the
executive and the vast operational military apparatus.251 This trend
has only intensified during the Trump Administration.252 Congress
remains interested in military matters but is disproportionately
focused on the nitty-gritty details of administrative military
functions, such as the vast, inefficient, and costly military
acquisitions process discussed below. Today, the administrative
military is the outsized focus of Congress, D.C. policymakers, and
the vast military contracting apparatus eager to tap into valuable
DoD acquisition and procurement funds.253 And each year Congress
passes a National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that largely
focuses on core administrative military matters.254
So how does Congress provide oversight over operational military
matters? The most powerful tool remains funding cutoffs that
target specific military operations.255 But absent an express
appropriations prohibition on a specific military operation, the
250 See David Vine, Where in the World is the U.S. Military?, POLITICO MAGAZINE
(July/Aug. 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/us-military-basesaround-the-world-119321 (noting the United States maintains approximately 800 military
bases in more than 70 countries); see also Turse, supra note 41 (reporting that Congress is
unaware of many current military operations).
251 See Michael Gordon, Trump Shifting Authority Over Military Operations Back to
Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2019, at A1 (noting the current executive administration’s
efforts to control military operations).
252 Id.
253 See Fallows, supra note 191 (noting that a large portion of debates in D.C. on the
military surround the budget given to the administrative military).
254 See Schifrin, supra note 36 (noting that the NDAA is one of Congress’s primary tools to
define the military’s direction in the upcoming year).
255 See
generally RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20775,
CONGRESSIONAL USE OF FUNDING CUTOFFS SINCE 1970 INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY FORCES
AND OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS (Jan 16, 2007).
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already established operational military structure located
throughout the world continually tips the balance in favor of the
Commander in Chief in operational matters. Further, combatant
commanders may continually capitalize upon their statutory
authority to establish subordinate commands—the all-important
joint task forces—that are even further removed from
administrative law and congressional oversight.256
B. THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S SECOND LEGACY: THE
MILITARIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Under the operational and administrative military divide, the
geographic combatant commanders now exercise an increasingly
important role in America’s foreign policy.257 They are increasingly
seen as “effectively displac[ing] American ambassadors and the
State Department as the primary instruments of American foreign
policy.”258 The combatant commanders’ core mission includes the
broadly defined military to military engagement and fostering close
relations with host nations (many of them economic beneficiaries of
DoD’s overseas apparatus).259 And the status of the geographic
combatant commanders has only increased since GoldwaterNichols’s passage in 1986.260 Indeed, the capstone billet for senior
officers is now serving as the head of a geographic combatant
command or CJCS, not as the heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marines.261
For example, General James Jones departed his administrative
military position as Commandant of the Marine Corps to serve as
the European Commander—demonstrating that even the hallowed
position of Commandant was a mere stepping-stone to something

256 John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 2283–92 (2008) (discussing the
military’s growing independence from political leadership since the end of World War II).
257 See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 1–15 (discussing the power and influence of
Combatant Commanders in foreign policy).
258 Kohn, supra note 246, at 17.
259 See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 1 (stating that the combatant commands, and thus the
combatant commanders as their leadership, are responsible for both executing military policy
and for playing an important role in foreign policy).
260 See discussion supra Part IV.A..
261 See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 1–2 (noting the prestige of the Combatant
Commander role).
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bigger in the operational military.262 While the military has always
conducted a host of activities that are closer to traditional foreign
policy functions, its role in diplomacy has grown substantially in the
recent past.263
This trend will persist at least for the near term, due to actions
within the Trump Administration that amplify the operational
military’s foreign policy influence. The military is increasingly
called upon to perform traditional foreign policy functions and fill
the void left behind by massive personnel shortages at the State
Department.264 Geographic combatant commanders are already
present throughout the world and possess comparably large staffs
and deep relationships with the nations in their region.265 State
Department ambassadorships remain unfilled.266 Diplomats are
resigning en masse and may never be replaced.267 The preexisting
massive overseas operational military apparatus thus becomes the
de facto voice of both the American military and diplomacy. The

262 See
Jim
Jones
Fast
Facts,
CNN.COM
(Jan.
2,
2019,
2:54
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/08/20/us/jim-jones-fast-facts/index.html.
263
See, e.g., Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 2–3 (outlining the importance of the
diplomatic dimensions of combatant commanders’ roles in recent decades).
264 Within military doctrine, the United States employs all the instruments of national
power under the “DIME” paradigm (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). See
JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at I-4 (“[W]aging war should involve the use of all
instruments of national power that one group can bring to bear against another (diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic).”).
265 See Combatant Commands, supra note 12 (listing the places where geographic
combatant commanders are stationed around the world).
266 See
Ambassador
Assignments
Overseas,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
ST.,
https://www.state.gove/documents/organization/288550.pdf (Jan. 2, 2019, 12:13PM) (listing
every State Department ambassadorship and denoting the posts which are vacant).
267 See, e.g., Lesley Wroughton, Top U.S. Diplomat for Europe Resigns, Cites Personal,
Professional Reasons, Reuters (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaeurope-diplomat/top-u-s-diplomat-for-europe-resigns-cites-personal-professional-reasonsidUSKCN1PG24Z (reporting the resignation of diplomat Wess Mitchell); John Hudson et al.,
U.S. Envoy to Coalition Fighting ISIS Resigns in Protest of Trump’s Syria Decision, WASH.
Post (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-envoy-tocoalition-fighting-isis-resigns-in-protest-of-trumps-syria-decision/2018/12/22/a5f42bc0-060611e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html (reporting the resignation of diplomat Brett McGurk);
Gardiner Harris, Diplomats Sound the Alarm as They Are Pushed Out in Droves, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
24,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/us/politics/state-departmenttillerson.html (discussing the departure of Bill A. Miller). For an in-depth critique of
American foreign policy and its increasing reliance on the military, see generally FARROW,
supra note 31.
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combatant commanders and their staffs provide continuity—albeit
a military-focused one—through changeovers in administrations.268
Military geographic combatant commanders also have several
strategic advantages over the State Department and its diplomatic
corps. Ambassadorships and foreign policy officials overseas are
assigned to a single nation.269 And ambassadorships often remain
vacant for extended periods.270 Combatant commands are never
vacant.271 Further, military combatant commanders have a broader
scope and can focus on enormous geographic regions of fifty-plus
nations within their respective Area of Responsibility.272 Their
permanent headquarters staff often exceeds 1,000 military officers,
and subordinate commands under their control far exceed that
number.273
Beyond their headquarters staffs, military combatant
commanders have military attachés in each nation that work hand
in hand with host nations and their foreign policy apparatus.274
Their relationships run deep.275 Foreign military sales and the
allure of additional military funding incentivize foreign government

268 See Vasilios Tasikas, Developing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Need for a New
Strategic Paradigm, 2007 ARMY L. 45, 58 (2007) (discussing the continuity fostered by the
combatant command structure).
269 See Ambassador Assignments Overseas, supra note 266 (listing the individual countries
to which each ambassador is assigned).
270 See, e.g., Thomas F. Farr & William L. Saunders, Jr., The Bush Administration and
America’s International Religious Freedom Policy, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 949, 956 (2009)
(noting that an ambassadorship remained vacant for almost twenty months until John V.
Hanford III took the post).
271 See DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the Pentagon, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Apr.
23,
2008),
http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4216
(demonstrating the rapidity with which combatant command posts are filled once vacant, so
as to virtually never be vacant).
272 See
European
Command
Fact
Sheets,
U.S.
EUROPEAN
COMMAND
http://www.eucom.mil/about/history/fact-sheets (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) (providing an
overview of the European Command); see also Area of Responsibility, U.S. AFR. COMMAND,
https://www.africom.mil/area-of-responsibility (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) (listing the fiftythree nations within the U.S. African Command’s Area of Responsibility).
273 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 211, at 12.
274 See, e.g., About the Command, U.S. AFR. COMMAND, https://africom.mil/about-thecommand (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (noting that “the command’s program in Africa are
coordinated through Offices of Security Cooperation and Defense Attaché Offices”).
275 See, e.g., id. (listing all the ways by which the African combatant command is able to
“establish and sustain relationships”).
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to strengthen those relationships.276 There is a blurring of the lines
between traditional military-to-military engagement and more
traditional diplomatic functions.277 Indeed, combatant commanders
have an important voice on such matters, and Congress funds them
extremely well.278 Further, they have at their disposal an enormous
personal staff and their own “mini-airline” to include a fleet of
military aircraft with secure communications.279 Combatant
commanders can be whisked away at a moment’s notice anywhere
they please.280 When foreign governmental leaders look at American
actors overseas and assess who is truly well-funded and resourced,
the geographic combatant commanders surely come out on top.
Consider the case of European Command, which has been in
place since 1946 with an enormous engagement mission.281 Just
eighteen combatant commanders have led European Command
since the end of World War II.282 How many individual U.S.
ambassadorships across Europe have been held throughout that
timeframe? The headquarters staff alone has a permanent presence
of over 1,500 personnel; that number triples when taking into
account subordinate staffs.283 Today, there are 50,000-plus activeduty personnel in Europe spread over 250 pieces of individual real
estate.284

276 See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 4–7, 101 (describing how U.S. Military funding
to foreign governments encourages cooperation and fosters strong foreign relationships).
277 See id. at 7 (“The advantages of the [DoD] and disadvantages of the State Department
facilitate the ability of combatant commanders to influence policy.”).
278 See id. at 6 (“In 2006, combatant commanders are expected to control $30 billion
compared to $400 million in the past.”).
279 See,
e.,g.,
About
USTRANSCOM,
U.S.
TRANSP.
COMMAND,
https://www.ustranscom.mil/cmd/aboutustc.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (listing the
number of aircrafts available for combatant commands).
280 See id. (“USTRANSCOM delivers globally integrated mobility, deployment and
distribution solutions, and enabling capabilities for full-spectrum requirements in support of
national objectives.”).
281 See History, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, https://www/eucom.mil/about/history/history
(last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
282 See Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, EUCOM, https://www.eucom.mil/commander (last vistied
Feb. 19, 2019) (listing Scaparrotti as the Combatant Commander of European Command
since late spring of 2016, taking over from General Breedlove as the 18th Commander).
283 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 211, at 12 (charting the thousands of
personnel working for European Command).
284 See European Command Fact Sheets, supra note 272 (listing the number of active duty
personnel and the locations of European Command).
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Finally, geographic combatant commanders increasingly play a
leadership role within the executive branch and foreign relations
more generally following their retirement from the military.285 For
example, General James Mattis (former Central Commander) was
recently the Secretary of Defense,286 and General John Kelly (former
Southern Commander) served as White House Chief of Staff from
2017 to early 2019.287 Admiral Harry Harris (head of Pacific
Command) is America’s newest ambassador to South Korea.288 A
former Pacific Commander (Admiral Joseph Prueher) served as the
U.S. ambassador to China upon his retirement.289 General Anthony
Zinni (former Central Commander) served as U.S. special envoy to
the Middle East,290 and General James Jones (former European
Commander) served as President Obama’s National Security
Advisor.291 And of course the first CJCS after Goldwater-Nichols,
Colin Powell, served as Secretary of State.292
C. THE TWO-MILITARY’S THIRD LEGACY: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACTS’S (APA) UNEVEN
APPLICATION TO THE TWO MILITARIES

While the judiciary has historically been the least influential of
the three branches in ensuring civilian control over the military,
judicial review via the APA remains an important vehicle in
ensuring accountability over all federal agencies, and the DoD is no

285 See Mark R. Shulman, Support and Defend: Civil-Military Relations in the Age of
Obama, 443 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 409, 443 (2012) (“[T]he United States has experienced a
militarization of foreign relations. The increased resources invested in diplomacy, public
diplomacy, and nonmilitary foreign aid pale in comparison to the . . . influence of Regional
Combatant Commands . . . .”).
286 James N. Mattis Biography, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://dod.defense.gov/About/
Biographies/Biography-View/Article/1055835/james-mattis/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).
287 John
F. Kelly Biography, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://dod.defense.gov/About/
Biographies/Biography-View/Article/602724/john-f-kelly/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).
288 Ambassador
Harry Harris, U.S. EMBASSY & CONSULATE IN S. KOR.,
https://kr.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/our-ambassador/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).
289 See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 2.
290 Anthony Zinni Biography, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUTUS/LEADERSHIP/Bio-Article-View/Article/904782/anthony-zinni/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2019).
291 General James L. Jones, Jr., ATLANTIC COUNCIL, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
about/experts/list/james-jones#fullbio (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).
292 See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 2.
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exception.293 Indeed, citizen suits—particularly in environmental
law—ensure a continual level of accountability between the military
and the citizenry.294 The APA provides that connective tissue
between the citizenry and the military (via the judiciary).295 In light
of the DoD’s unique mission, and the two-military divide, a
fundamental question arises: Should administrative law and the
APA treat the operational military differently from the
administrative military?
Despite the DoD’s size, budget, and idiosyncratic mission,
administrative law scholarship has “generally passed over the study
of the military in favor of the domestic agencies.”296 Indeed, very
little legal scholarship has addressed the APA’s applicability to the
DoD (despite its status as the largest federal agency).297
The APA (passed in 1946, just one year before the National
Security Act) provides for judicial review over agency actions and
sets out procedures that agencies must follow when promulgating
rules and adjudicating conflicts.298 The APA has been described as
a “mini-Constitution” and widely praised as a mechanism to help
ensure democratic accountability and oversight over federal
agencies.299 But the APA was designed for a far different time and
does not adequately take into account: (1) the DoD’s existing legal
architecture and two-military divide; and (2) the complexity of
293 See Dunlap, supra note 125, at 368–70 (providing a brief overview of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence regarding the military).
294 See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 16 (2008) (suing Donald C. Winter,
Secretary of the Navy, for violating environmental laws).
295 See Arthur E. Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Rule-Making Under the APA, 71
MICH. L. REV. 221, 221–26 (1972) (discussing how the APA ensures public participation in
the administrative rulemaking schemes, including those of the military).
296 Yoo, supra note 256, at 2281. For additional discussions of administrative-law
scholarship on the military, see generally Thomas R. Folk, The Administrative Procedure Act
and the Military Departments, 6 J. NAT’L ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUD. 109 (1986); Bonfield, supra
note 295.
297 There are some rare exceptions. See Kovacs, supra note 195, at 584 (arguing that there
is no basis for courts to give greater deference to the military); Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look
or a Blind-Eye, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 512 (2006) (discussing how the Department of Justice,
DoD, Department of Homeland Security, and other war-related agencies are subject to review
under APA §706 but that this is often overlooked).
298 See, e.g., JAMES RASBAND ET AL. NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 223 (2009)
(praising the many virtues of the APA in democratic governance).
299 See ABA, Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates August 8–9, 2011, R.124 (2011)
(“Over time, the APA has become a ‘mini Constitution’ that provides fundamental fairness
for litigants before administrative agencies.”).
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modern military operations to include the numerous military
activities that take place overseas outside of war. The APA was
better suited to regulate military activities, but it has not kept pace
with changes to the massive military organization and the nature
of modern warfare. This results in a disconnect between the APA’s
text and its ongoing applicability to the modern military
organization.
1. The APA’s Definition of Agency Clearly Applies to the
Administrative Military but Lacks a Clear Application to the
Operational Military
The APA broadly defines “agency” as “each authority of the
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or
subject to review by another agency.”300 Congress, courts, and
governments of the United States are specifically exempt from the
agency definition.301 While the President is not specifically exempt,
courts have routinely held that the President is not an agency
within the APA’s meaning.302 This is of particular importance for
military matters due to the President’s role as Commander in Chief.
However, “agency” includes the Secretary of Defense and the
civilian Secretaries of the military departments who remain subject
to suit under the APA. This conclusion is reaffirmed by the text of
the APA’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) section, which
specifically applies to any executive department or military
department.303 And the Secretary of Defense and civilian
Secretaries of the military departments are routinely sued.304
Because the APA “agency” definition clearly applies to the civilian
heads of the administrative military, it follows that APA litigation
5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A)–(D) (2012).
302 See Dalton v. Spencer, 511 U.S. 462, 470 (1994) (“The actions of the President, in turn,
are not reviewable under the APA because . . . the President is not an ‘agency.’”).
303 The full section states that “agency” includes “any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment in the executive branch.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (2012). And Section 552a of the
APA, entitled “Records maintained on individuals” shares this same definition of “agency.” 5
U.S.C. § 552a (2012). See also Mark P. Nevitt, Defending the Environment: A Mission for the
World’s Militaries, 36 HAW. L. REV 27, 36 (2014) (describing how the APA serves an important
role in helping to ensure civilian control over the military).
304 See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (suing the Secretary of the
Navy for violating environmental laws).
300
301
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is focused on administrative military functions via lawsuits against
the Secretary of Defense or civilian Secretaries of military
departments. For example, the Secretaries of Defense and military
departments were the defendants in numerous lawsuits challenging
the forthcoming change in transgender service policy.305
It is less clear whether the heads of the operational military
(combatant commands and joint task force commands) are an
“authority of the Government of the United States” within the
APA’s agency definition.306 Although the operational military is not
specifically exempt from judicial review, it remains unclear how the
APA applies to the operational military. No lawsuit to date has held
that an agency includes a combatant commander or subordinate
operational commander, although a suit against the Secretary of
Defense as the head of the operational military remains possible.307
In addition, much of the operational military’s decision-making
(particularly by the geographic combatant commanders) takes place
outside the United States, where it is not clearly subject to the
APA’s reach, which lacks a clear extraterritorial application.308
Finally, for an APA suit to come forward, actual knowledge of an
agency action is required; a particular problem for operational
military matters that occur outside the United States, are out of
sight, and are often classified.309 Secrecy is itself a form of
regulation, bypassing traditional forms of judicial review or civilian
control.310
Daugherty v. United States, a non-precedential opinion, remains
the one federal case addressing the peculiarities of the APA and the

305 See Mark P. Nevitt, A Tumultuous Year for Transgender Service Members, REG. REV.,
(Jan.
31,
2018)
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/01/31/nevitt-tumultuous-yeartransgender-service-members/ (providing a timeline of these actions).
306 5 U.S.C. §551(1) (2012).
307 Nor have they held otherwise. The law remains unsettled on this point. See infra notes
311–35 and accompanying text.
308 See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“We assume that Congress
legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.”).
309 See David Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 272 (2010) (providing a textualist
view on how the President’s designation as Commander in Chief provides authority to conceal
some military information).
310 See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 59–80 (1998)
(devoting a chapter to the different ways government can regulate what its citizens know).
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Goldwater-Nichols two-military divide.311 In Daugherty a service
member attached to an operational military command in Spain filed
a tort claim against the Secretary of Defense and Navy (among
others).312 He asserted that the Goldwater-Nichols Act divested the
Navy of any type of authority over him.313 The Tenth Circuit
rejected that argument, focusing instead on the Act’s establishment
of the administrative chain of command that served as an umbilical
cord between the Navy and the service member.314 This
administrative chain of command, as discussed in Part III, runs
from the military member to the Secretary of the Navy and the
Secretary of Defense. The court did not specifically address the
combatant commander’s role; the judgment focused solely on
administrative functions that could be traced back to the
Secretaries of the military departments.315 There was no discussion
of the operational chain of command, or on whether the European
Commander and the operational military leadership are subject to
suit.316
To be clear, I am not advocating that the APA should apply to
truly operational military matters such as the tactical movement of
forces or military raids. However, there is an expanding menu of
activities undertaken by the operational military that have
administrative components—hiring and firing personnel,
responding to FOIA requests, issuing routine guidance—that is
outside the formal rulemaking process and may not be subject to
judicial review.317 Hence, to borrow from the nomenclature adopted
by Professors Adrian Vermeule and David Dyzenhaus, an
institutional hole emerges within the operational military.318 Any
311 See 73 Fed. Appx. 326, 327–32 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the APA claim was not
justiciable, due to the bifurcated authority within the military). This is a non-precedential
10th Circuit opinion, further underscoring the lack of authority on the subject.
312 Id. at 328.
313 Id.
314 See id. at 331 (“[S]ection 165 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act . . . provided for the Secretary
of the Navy to remain responsible for the administration of forces assigned to combatant
commands.”).
315 See id. at 327–32 (not discussing the role of a combatant commander).
316 See id. (addressing neither the operational chain of command nor the liability of the
Commander of European Command and the operational military leadership).
317 See Adrian Vermeule, supra note 47, at 1112 (noting that the “APA explicitly excludes
‘military or foreign affairs’ functions from its procedural requirements,” but that these
functions are not explicitly defined).
318 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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function associated with the three different types of operational
military control (combatant command,319 operational control, or
tactical control320) remains outside the APA’s reach. How does
administrative law account for these activities? To date courts have
yet to “pierce the operational veil” in applying the APA to such
matters.321 Perhaps this stems from confusion about the twomilitary chain of command or deference to military operational
commanders. Regardless of the reason, it appears that the
administrative military will continue to be subject to APA while
courts will provide additional (if not absolute) deference to the
operational military.
2. APA Military Exemptions and Military Deference as Applied to
the Operational and Administrative Militaries
Since its passage in the aftermath of World War II, the APA has
specifically exempted certain military activities based upon when
they are occurring and what they do.322 Despite repeated calls to
address or reform the APA’s military exemptions, they persist and
are virtually unchanged from their original form.323 These express
exemptions include “military authority exercised in the field in the
time of war or in occupied territory” and “military or foreign affairs
functions of the United States.”324 They amount to APA “black holes”
319 See 10 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1)(A)–(G) (2012) (outlining the command authority of combatant
commanders). Under joint doctrine, this includes “[n]ontransferable command authority,
which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command
over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning
tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military
operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the
command.” DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 37.
320 See DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 175, 243 (defining both operational and tactical
control).
321 The definition of combatant command includes an administrative component:
“coordinating and approving those aspects of administration and support (including control
of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to
carry out missions assigned to the command.” 10 U.S.C. § 164 (c)(1)(F) (2012).
322 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A)–(H) (2012) (listing exemptions to the definition of agency which
include courts martial, military commissions and military authority exercised in the field in
time of war); see also Kovacs, supra note 195, at 584 (arguing that there is no basis for courts
to give greater deference to the military); Masur, supra note 297, at 512 (noting exemptions
to the APA for military purpose).
323 See Bonfield, supra note 295, at 240–44 (discussing the APA exemption of “military
function”).
324 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(G), 553(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
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where military activities occur outside the constraints of judicial
review.325
The terms “military authority” and “in the field in the time of
war” lack a clear definition (and we have not had a formal
declaration of war since 1942).326 As this provision has not been
modified since 1946, courts have struggled to apply this exemption
to modern conflicts.327 As a fundamental matter, modern military
activities cannot be neatly placed in clear legal categories. The
division between war and peace remains murky.
The APA’s rulemaking and adjudications section exempts
“military or foreign affairs functions of the United States.”328 The
term “military function” is of central importance but it, too, lacks a
clear statutory definition.329 Despite this exemption’s broad
implications as applied to DoD, it has not been the subject of much
legal scholarship; nor have judicial decisions provided helpful
guidance on its precise meaning.330 The APA also broadly excludes
from review agency action “committed to agency discretion by
law.”331 This catchall exclusion has been used to preclude review in
national security contexts.332

See Vermeule, supra note 47, at 1107–1117 (defining APA “black holes”).
The last time the United States Congress exercised its constitutional authority to do so
was 1942 in the middle of the Second World War when the U.S. declared war against
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. See Franke-Ruta, supra note 7 (noting all three
declarations in table 1).
327 See Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1381 (1991) (determining that the decision to use
unapproved drugs on servicemen in combat during the Persian Gulf War was subject to
judicial review); see also Thomas R. Folk, The Administrative Procedure Act and the Military
Departments, 6 J. NAT’L ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES 109, 114 (1986) (noting the lack of
guidance given by courts).
328 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
329 See Bonfield, supra note 295, at 240–42 (discussing different possible interpretations of
“military function”).
330 This exemption has only been comprehensively addressed by a single law review article
dating back forty years. See Bonfield, supra note 295, at 240–41 (arguing that based on the
plain meaning, the exemption applies to the extent that there are “‘clearly and directly’
involved in . . . matters specifically fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of the armed forces
in light of their peculiar nature and qualifications”).
331 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
332 See, e.g., Riverkeeper Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d. 156, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
Congress through the APA has not given the court’s jurisdiction to review agency action the
national security context).
325
326
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Perhaps not surprisingly, the DoD has often sought a broad
interpretation of these APA exemptions.333 This is somewhat
understandable; it seems absurd to subject critical war making and
tactical decision-making to judicial review.334 In addition, courts
will always afford a certain amount of deference to the DoD in
reviewing its actions, regardless of its activity.335
The question remains, what level of deference should be afforded
to the expanding menu of military actions performed by an
operational military commander outside of an armed conflict such
as training, engagement, or routine administrative functions
(FOIA, hiring and firing, etc.) embedded within the command? It is
unclear what level of deference a court can or should afford to the
operational military vis-à-vis the administrative military and how
to weigh the relevant factors in determining the deference
afforded.336 And rules regulating military functions as applied to
military contractors are exempt from following the APA rulemaking
process.337

333 See Bonfield, supra note 295, at 257 (“The term ‘military function’ is viewed by those
who must apply it as being very broad in scope. . . . . The [DoD], for example, is likely to rely
on the ‘military function’ exemption. . . .”).
334 See Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175, 186 (4th Cir. 2015) (refusing to
call into question the command structures of an existing military operation).
335 See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (noting that the Court will
“hesitate long” before interfering in the relationship between military personnel and their
superior officers); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (holding that the Court is not well
positioned to interfere in composition, training, equipping and control of the military force,
or core administrative military functions).
336 In a Supreme Court decision dating from 2006, Justice Breyer struggled with the level
of deference that should be afforded to the military in Winter v. NRDC.
I don’t know anything about this. I’m not a naval officer. But if I see an
admiral come along with an affidavit that says . . . you’ve got to train people
[when there are certain types of oceanographic conditions] all right, or there
will be subs hiding there with all kinds of terrible weapons, and he swears
that under oath. And I see on the other side a district judge who just says,
you’re wrong, I then have to look to see what the basis is, because I know
that district judge doesn’t know about it either.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 55 U.S. 7 (2008) (No.
07-1239) [hereinafter Breyer Oral Argument].
337 See Indep. Guard Ass’n, Local No. 1 v. O’Leary, 57 F.3d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1995)
(construing the military function narrowly as applied to the Department of Energy while
noting that “[t]o our knowledge, no court has ever considered whether the military function
exception applies to civilian contractors”).
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Doe v. Sullivan may offer some guidance.338 In Doe, a service
member used the APA to challenge the HHS Secretary’s decision to
allow DoD to use an unapproved drug in the event of a chemical
nerve gas attack.339 In dismissing the service member’s complaint,
the court refused to apply the “military authority” exception, not
seeing this decision as part of a military exigency.340 Nevertheless,
the court hinted in dicta of a more generalized Commander-in-Chief
exemption that if applied broadly would eliminate an enormous
swath of operational military decisions from examination under the
APA (as opposed to statutory delegation based on other
constitutional provisions).341 This would appear to “immunize
administrative actions that rely upon the President’s constitutional
Commander-in-Chief power,”342 an authority wholly independent of
APA oversight with an outsized effect on operational military
matters:
Plaintiffs seek review under the Administrative
Procedure Act . . . of a rule published in the Federal
Register by the Secretary of HHS, who is not part of any
military chain of command . . .[w]hen he adopted the
rule, [the Secretary] did not purport to be exercising the
President’s powers as Commander in Chief . . . .343
Courts have struggled mightily to apply a consistent and uniform
standard when determining the level of deference to afford to the
military. For example, in Gilligan v. Morgan, the Court stated:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence. The
complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a
938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1380.
340 See id. at 1380–81 (finding the matter suitable for judicial review because it was “not a
dispute over military strategy or discipline, not one between soldiers and their superiors, but
one over the scope of the authority Congress has entrusted to the FDA”).
341 See Masur, supra note 297, at 513 (describing how the dicta in Doe, if adopted would
shield many actions from scrutiny).
342 Id.
343 Doe, 938 F.2d at 1380 (quoting plaintiff’s counsel).
338

339
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military force are essentially military judgments,
subject always to the civilian control of the Legislative
and Executive Branches.344
The military deference doctrine is premised on both the
Executive and Legislative Branches exercising some modicum of
control.345 But there has been a continual derogation of civilian
control over operational military matters.346 How should
administrative law account for this?
And for the first time in modern history, the Supreme Court lacks
active-duty veteran representation among its members.347 While it
still remains unclear what impact this will have on the Court’s
application of the military deference doctrine, the Court’s firsthand
wartime military knowledge has disappeared for the time being.348
Further complicating matters, military deference standards are
flexible and prone to manipulation in the national security context:
“federal courts manipulate flexible legal standards to accord
heightened deference to federal agencies during national crises,
transforming standards such as ‘reasonableness’ and ‘good cause’
into ‘grey holes.’”349
3. Secrecy as Self-Regulation350
Finally, a significant number of military actions occur without
the knowledge of the American public and are afforded what

344 Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10; see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)
(stating that the judiciary “must give great deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest”).
345 See Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10 (basing the Court’s deference on the commitment of control
to the Legislative and Executive Branches).
346 See infra Part IV.A (describing the centralization of military power and the diminishing
civilian control of the operational military).
347 See Andrew Cohen, None of the Supreme Court Justices Has Battle Experience, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/08/none-of-thesupreme-court-justices-has-battle-experience/260973 (noting that with the retirement of
Justice Stevens in 2010, the Supreme Court lacked a justice with wartime military experience
for the first time since 1936).
348 See id. (noting that Justice Alito served in the Army Reserves in the 1970s and that
Justice Breyer was in the Army briefly during college in 1957).
349 Evan Criddle, Mending Holes in the Rule of (Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 309, 309 (2010).
350 This term is borrowed from the writing of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, discussed supra
note 310.
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amounts to blanket military deference.351 This further shields the
operational military from civilian and administrative law oversight.
Compounding matters, while much of the administrative military’s
actions and regulations are open, easily accessible, and unclassified,
much of the operational military’s internal regulations and decisionmaking are outside the public domain and hidden.352
Within the DoD, over-classification of documents and material
that do not merit classification remains a continual problem.353
Indeed, citizen suits and judicial review are predicated on actual
knowledge of the underlying regulation and some degree of
familiarity to understand the regulation and its practical impact.
This is particularly difficult for operational military matters that
occur outside the United States.354 After all, how can the public
make a determination whether an agency properly interpreted its
internal guidance if it is classified or otherwise not easily accessible
to the public?355
Finally, in the national security context, courts will often
ascertain whether there is an affirmative legal obligation when
determining if an agency action is even reviewable.356 The
operational military has considerably more discretion in its actions
351 Cf Masur, supra note 297, at 449 (describing the court’s acceptance of the Executive
argument that “an entire range of military questions . . . are entirely beyond the court’s
reach”).
352 For example, the Department of Defense and all the Secretaries of the Military
Departments have open websites that organize all the applicable internal regulations to that
agency. See, e.g., Forms, Directives, and Instructions, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
https://dod.defense.gove/Resources/Forms-Directives/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (compiling
links to internal regulations). Contrast this to the operational combatant commands whose
regulations and policies are not easily accessible to the public and are oftentimes classified.
See, e.g., Freedom of Information (FOIA Request), U.S. CYBER COMMAND,
https://www.cybercom.mil/FOIA/Making-a-Freedom-of-Information-Act-FOIA-Request/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (displaying only an explanation on how to make a FOIA request rather
than offering relevant information about regulations and policies on the website).
353 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSPECTOR GENERAL, DOD EVALUATION OF OVERCLASSIFICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION (2013) (acknowledging and evaluating
persistent misclassification and over-classification of documents within the DoD)..
354 See Pozen, supra note 309, at 299 (“[T]he United States has a long and pervasive history
of executive branch secrecy in matters relating to internal deliberations and military
strategy.”).
355 See id., at 286 (discussing arguments against state secrecy and stating that concealing
activities “reduces the ability of the people . . . to monitor those activities and to identify and
debate relevant issues in an informed manner”).
356 See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 678 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing in dicta the
meaning of “agency action” under the APA).
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as compared to the administrative military; this adds a final level
of deference in determining whether their action is reviewable. For
example, a federal court that recently considered the National
Security Agency’s program for warrantless electronic surveillance
of suspected terrorists stated (in dicta) that the terrorist
surveillance program was not an “agency action” covered by the
APA as there was no legal obligation to conduct the surveillance.357
D. THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S FOURTH LEGACY: AN INCREASINGLY
DIVIDED MILITARY, UNDERMINING OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

First, the two-military divide leads to continual, bureaucratic
tension between the administrative military leaders and the
operational, uniformed military commanders. Consider this
comment from a DoD expert on the dual administrative and
operational military divide:
Service chiefs are, by far, the most important people in
the [Pentagon] when it comes to physical things, real
things, people, equipment, training, et cetera. Service
chiefs are all-powerful. When it comes to operations in
the field, they’re not in the game . . . we’ve got two
different channels where power is exercised, but it only
comes together at the Secretary [of Defense].358
As discussed in Part III, under Goldwater-Nichols there are two
distinct chains of command with the administrative military legally
required to provide forces to the operational military.359 The parallel
chains of command only meet at the very top of the DoD at the
Secretary of Defense.360 This places an enormous strain on one
person, the Secretary of Defense, who suffers from continual
overextension as the critical intermediary between the two
357 See id. (stating that plaintiffs failed to complain of “agency action” as it was defined in
the APA because the surveillance program constituted “conduct, not ‘agency action’”). Since
this ruling, Cyber Command has been split off from the NSA and is now a full-fledged
combatant command. See Ferdinando, supra note 241 (announcing the creation of Cyber
Command).
358 Goldwater-Nichols Hearing, supra note 15, at 35.
359 See supra Part III; see also 10 U.S.C. § 162(b) (2012) (describing the split in the chain of
command).
360 See Goldwater-Nichols Hearing, supra note 15, at 35.
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militaries and must continuously bridge the operational and
administrative military divide while reconciling their competing
interests.361
As new weapons are produced, older weaponry continues to be
maintained.362 The maintenance cost for the older weaponry and
material is often much, much lower, but the money, jobs, and
governmental funding lies in the newer, shinier equipment.363 So a
perverse incentive emerges to fund new equipment and weaponry,
regardless of whether the operational military even needs it.364 This
has led to bizarre instances where the DoD receives weapons and
equipment that it has not asked for and does not want.365 Consider
the following two examples.
First, the tension between the operational and administrative
military over replacing the A-10 “Warthog” attack jet, a Vietnamera plane that was widely lauded by operational military
commanders,366 with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). 367 As the JSF
came into production, Congress sought to phase out the Air Force’s
use of the A-10 earlier than desired by the operational military
commanders.368 Keeping the A-10s in service would lower the
number of JSFs that the DoD purchased.369 A standoff occurred
361 See id. at 116 (discussing generally the problems associated with this divide and
pointing to a “ponderousness, if not paralysis, because so many different organizations had
to be involved in even the smallest decisions”).
362 See id. at 456–60 (discussing the problem of weaponry overspending and waste).
363 See GATES, supra note 44, at 459 (“The history of the Defense Department acquisition
and development of new programs is rich in over-cost, overdue, and flawed programs.”).
364 See Matthew Cox, Pentagon Tells Congress to Stop Buying Equipment it Doesn’t Need,
MILITARY.COM (Jan. 2015), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/01/28/pentagon-tellscongress-to-stop-buying-equipment-it-doesnt-need.html (noting, for example, that Congress
continues to give the Army millions of dollars for tank upgrades when the Army notes they
“simply don’t have the structure” for such tanks anymore).
365 Id.; GATES, supra note 44, at 459–60 (discussing the cult of spending in the DoD).
366 See Martha McSally, Opinion, Saving a Plane that Saves Lives, N.Y. TIMES (April 20,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/opinion/saving-a-plane-that-saves-lives.html
(praising the A-10 from her experience as an Air Force Colonel).
367 See Thomas Gibbons-Neff, The A-10 Get a Lease on Life–at Least Through 2017, WASH.
POST (Jan. 14, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/14/thea-10-gets-a-lease-on-life-at-least-through-2017/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.94fc9b6b05f0
(“[T]he Air Force decided to retire the A-10 to make way for more modern aircraft like the
[JSF].”).
368 See id. (reporting that the then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter noted commanders’
demand for the A-10 in the fight against the Islamic State).
369 See Lara Seligman, Air Force Clarifies A-10 Retirement Plans, DEFENSE NEWS (Mar. 17,
2016),
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2016/03/17/air-force-clarifies-a-10-retirement-
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between the Air Force, Congress, and the operational military
commanders.370
While the standoff was ultimately resolved and the A-10 was
given a temporary reprieve, its long-term future remains very much
in doubt.371 The JSF case study highlights a new phenomenon
within the DoD: the administrative military provides forces to the
operational military, but this occurs outside a direct command and
control relationship or any clear accountability mechanism.372
Again, it is only the Secretary of Defense who has the legal authority
to referee disputes between the two militaries, but congressional
interests can hinder even his authority.373 While the acquisition,
testing, and development of the JSF is a core administrative
military function, its eventual day-to-day operation overseas under
the command of a combatant commander is an operational military
function.374 And the administrative military is not clearly
accountable to the operational military: under Goldwater-Nichols,
they are not in the same direct chain of command.375 While the
operational military is focused on operational military effectiveness
on the battlefield above all else, the administrative military leaders
operate under significant constraints and a far different incentive
structure.376 This includes the watchful eye of Congress members,
many of whom are interested in economic benefits to their
individual congressional districts.377

plans/ (stating that the budget for the Air Force would delay the A-10’s retirement and
replacement with JSFs).
370 See Gibbons-Neff, supra note 367 (discussing the “Congressional blockade” and other
strong stances about whether or not the A-10 should be retired).
371 See id. (stating that the A-10 will continue to be used beyond 2017); see also Seligman,
supra note 369 (indicating that the A-10 could live on into the fiscal year of 2022).
372 See id. at 458–60 (discussing problems with Joint Strike Fighter acquisitions, which
was “over budget and behind schedule”).
373 See id. at 116 (discussing the divides that the Secretary of Defense has to scale and the
multiple interests that must be accounted for in each decision).
374 See id. at 458–60 (noting the different interests and authorities at play in the Joint
Strike Fighter acquisition).
375 See 10 U.S.C. § 162(b) (setting forth the chain of command for the operational military
to not include leadership of the administrative military).
376 See GATES, supra note 44, at 116–17 (discussing the dichotomy between incentive
structures for command and administrative military personnel in decision making).
377 See Fallows, supra note 191, at 72 (arguing that many in Congress view military
spending primarily as a way to bring jobs to their district).
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Second, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s frustrations
in getting the administrative military to provide responsive and
necessary equipment and weaponry to the operational military
engaged in war-fighting.378 For example, upon a visit to the
operational military, then-Secretary Gates saw firsthand the
desperate need for soldiers in Afghanistan to receive Mine Resistant
Armored Personnel (MRAP) carriers to protect their lives.379
However, due to a quirk of Goldwater-Nichols, the Secretary of
Defense must approve the transfer of all forces between combatant
commands, regardless of their size or mission.380 Gates was
increasingly frustrated with this process, which took too long and
did not properly take into account the real-time force requirements
of the operational military.381 Much to his dismay, Gates had to
work creatively outside the existing force assignment system to
ensure that the soldiers in the field received the equipment that
they needed.382
In sum, the Secretaries of the military departments (and
Congress) are disproportionately focused on the long-term defense
acquisitions process that addresses future threats at the expense of
meeting current threats.383 The combatant commander receives
forces from the individual services, but the services are not directly
accountable for the type of equipment and personnel assigned.384
This creates an administrative-operational disconnect in which the
operational military’s real-time requirements are often out of sync
with what is supplied by the administrative military, a fourth
legacy of the two-military divide.

378 See GATES, supra note 44, at 121–22 (discussing Gates’s experience bridging the divide
between the administrative and operational sides of the military).
379 See id. at 119–26 (discussing Gates’s perceptions about operational needs in
Afghanistan).
380 See 10 U.S.C. § 162 (a)(3) (2012) (mandating that any force assigned to a combatant
command may only by transferred from that command pursuant to the authority of the
Secretary of Defense).
381 See GATES, supra note 44, at 117–18 (describing his frustration with the process).
382 See id. at 121–23 (outlining how Gates worked around the difficulties that GoldwaterNichols created to supply soldiers with MRAPs).
383 See MCINNIS, supra note 130, at 14 (quoting Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who
stated that “[t]he Department of Defense is structured to plan and prepare for war, but not
to fight one”).
384 See id. (discussing Gates’s personal reflections on the structural issues he experienced
within the DoD).
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V. THREE KEY FACTORS ACCELERATING AND EXACERBATING THE
TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE
In this Part, I identify and analyze the three additional factors
that are exacerbating and accelerating the two-military divide.
They include: (1) Congressional focus on the administrative military
and the rise of the military-industrial-congressional complex; (2) the
decline in veterans serving in Congress influencing operational
military oversight; (3) and the tools of modern warfare that
empower the operational military.
A. THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S FIRST ACCELERANT: THE RISE OF THE
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL-CONGRESSIONAL COMPLEX

In his 1961 Farewell Address, President Dwight Eisenhower
famously warned of a “military-industrial complex.”385 Eisenhower,
the Allied Commander in World War II, warned of the rise of a vast
military organization and a persistent and powerful defense
establishment whose interests were increasingly and inextricably
linked with congressional interests.386 Noting that “[o]ur military
organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my
predecessors in peacetime,” President Eisenhower continued:
[W]e have been compelled to create a permanent
armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this,
three and a half million men and women are directly
engaged in the defense establishment. We annually
spend on military security more than the net income of
all United States corporations . . . . In the councils of
government, we must guard against the acquisition of
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by
the military-industrial complex.387

385 See Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961, YALE LAW
SCHOOL: THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp
(last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
386 Id. (“We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or
democratic processes.”).
387 Id. (emphasis added).
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Eisenhower lamented that he was unable to tame the militaryindustrial complex during his tenure, “lay[ing] down [his] official
responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of
disappointment.”388 Today, the “military establishment [is] large
enough to shape our dealings in the world and seriously influence
our economy.”389
Following World War II, the U.S. military did not shrink to a
small peacetime size with the Soviet threat and dawn of the nuclear
age. Despite Eisenhower’s warnings, the military-industrial
complex endures and evolves.390 Today, Congress is intimately
involved with the defense acquisition process, a core administrative
military function.391 Eisenhower’s warnings about the militaryindustrial complex can be more accurately described today as the
military-industrial-congressional complex, as military expenditures
are even more closely linked to jobs in congressional districts.392
Following World War II, the defense industry became a major part
of the U.S. economy.393 As a military-legal scholar has noted,
“Congress [makes] defense decisions based on parochial, constituent
interests rather than national concerns.”394
As whole communities and congressional districts became
dependent on military bases and local jobs that flow from the
military-industrial-congressional complex, congressional interests
and incentives became increasingly aligned with the administrative
military’s authorities.395 Indeed, the actions of the civilian Service
Id.
Fallows, supra note 191.
390 President Eisenhower once famously quipped, “God help this country when someone
sits in this chair who doesn’t know the military as well as I do.” MELVIN A. GOODMAN,
NATIONAL INSECURITY: THE COST OF AMERICAN MILITARISM 193 (2013).
391 See Fallows, supra note 191 (discussing Congress’s efforts to bring military spending to
their own districts).
392
See id. (“Political Engineering is the art of spreading a military project to as many
congressional districts as possible, and thus maximizing the number of members of Congress
who feel that if they cut off funding, they’d be hurting themselves.”).
393 See Louis Uchitelle, The U.S. Still Leans on the Military-Industrial Complex, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/business/economy/militaryindustrial-complex.html (reporting that 10% of U.S. factory output is sold to the DoD).
394 Dunlap, supra note 125, at 379.
395 See infra Part IV.A.3. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to address this
thoroughly, the explosion of campaign financial contributions has coincided with
congressional involvement (and receipt of campaign contributions) from the defense industry.
See, e.g., Clay Dillow, Defense Contractors Outgun Other Industries in Corporate PAC
Donations, FORTUNE (Jul. 15, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/15/defense-contractors-pac/
388
389
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Secretaries and civilian defense acquisitions professionals are
increasingly aligned; after all, the administrative military can win
and lose jobs in congressional districts.396
Despite
the
constitutional
provision
limiting
Army
appropriations to two years, it is now politically impractical for
Congress to cut funding to military members (and their families).397
Cuts do occur during the periodic Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) process, but often only after bitter fights in the halls of
Congress.398 After all, what may be good for the DoD may not be
good for members of Congress and their constituents. For example,
in 2010 then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates sought to save DoD
funds by closing the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, VA, an
obsolete and duplicative military command.399 However, members
of the Virginia congressional delegation fought Gates’s goal of
shuttering the command at every turn as they saw jobs leaving their
districts and their influence waning.400
When looking at Congressional interests vis-à-vis the two
militaries, the JSF again provides an instructive example of how
the two-military divide informs and shapes the modern acquisitions
process. As discussed in Part III, the Goldwater-Nichols Act heavily
emphasized joint warfare throughout its statutory scheme, leading
to a revolution in joint warfare and an increasing focus on
interoperability among the three services.401 Defense contractors
realize that “jointness” is the defining feature of the Goldwater(noting that defense industry PACs made up the majority portion of the top contributors to
Congress in the first quarter of 2015).
396 See, e.g., Fallows, supra note 191 (“In the late 1980s, a coalition of so-called cheap hawks
in Congress tried to cut the funding for the B-2 bomber. They got nowhere after it became
clear that work for the project was being carried out in 46 states and no fewer than 383
congressional districts (of 435 total).”).
397 See Rudesill, supra note 77, at 467–72 (providing several reasons why Congress cannot
cut funding).
398 See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, States and Communities Battling Another Round of Base
Closings, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/20/politics/statesand-communities-battling-another-round-of-base-closings.html (stating that Congress
created the base-closing process at the end of the Cold War and describing efforts by, among
others, Governors Bush (FL) and Schwarzenegger (CA), to stave off significant funding cuts
during the 2005 BRAC cycle).
399 See GATES, supra note 44, at 461–62 (discussing Gates’s decision to close the Norfolkbased Joint Forces Command).
400 See id. at 461–62 (describing how the Virginia delegation “went wild” after the proposed
closing announcement).
401 See supra Part III (discussing the Goldwater-Nichols legislation).
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Nichols military, and the JSF is being manufactured against this
backdrop across the three military branches that fly fixed-wing
aircraft (Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps).402
An enormously ambitious project, the total lifecycle cost for the
purchase of the 2,000-plus JSF planes now exceeds $1.1 trillion.403
Likely cognizant that the manufacture of this massively expensive
weapon would receive great scrutiny and interest from Congress,
the manufacturer (Lockheed Martin) of the JSF placed the location
of its various parts throughout nearly all 50 states and across even
more congressional districts.404
Shrewdly marketed and manufactured, the JSF has proven too
big to fail. While the JSF has been the subject of numerous
investigations, cost overruns, and criticisms concerning its safety
and operational effectiveness, its manufacture continues apace.405
Members of Congress, in turn, can point to “victories” in their
respective districts—manufacturing jobs that bolster their
individual standing and re-election bids. In a rare moment of
bipartisanship, Democratic and Republican members of Congress
even established a “Joint Strike Fighter Caucus” in an effort to
protect the JSF from budget cuts.406
The rise of the military-industrial-congressional complex and its
corresponding incentive structure has led to strange militarycongressional bedfellows. For example, Senator Bernie Sanders (IVT) can fairly be described as skeptical of both the operational

402 See Christian Davenport, Under Trump, the F-35’s Costs, More Than $1 Trillion Over
60
Years,
Continues
to
Draw
Scrutiny,
WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/12/08/under-trump-the-f-35scosts-more-than-1-trillion-over-60-years-continue-to-drawscrutiny/?utm_term=.ca7416ffdd3a (“The F-35 comes in three variants, one each for the Air
Force, the Navy and the Marines . . . .”).
403 See id. (noting that the project is projected to top $1 trillion over its 60-year life-span).
404 See Daniel Bukszpan, Why Bernie Sanders is Backing a $1.5 Trillion Military
Boondoggle, CNBC (Jul. 12, 2016, 9:52 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/12/why-berniesanders-is-backing-a-15-trillion-military-boondoggle.html (noting that 45 states and Puerto
Rico are involved in the production of the aircraft).
405 See Davenport, supra note 402 (noting billions of dollars in cost overruns and years of
delays caused by technical difficulties).
406 See T.W. Farnam, Caucus Forms to Save the F-35 From Budget Cuts, WASH. POST (Nov.
23, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/caucus-forms-to-save-the-f-35-frombudget-cuts/2011/11/22/gIQA6QDupN_story.html?utm_term=.32f9d2f05d9a (describing the
caucus formation and membership, specifically noting the location of Lockheed Martin’s main
airline-assembly plant in one of the caucus co-founder’s districts).
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military’s role in U.S. national security and defense spending more
generally.407 But he has been a consistent and reliable booster of the
JSF, irrespective of escalating costs.408 Vermont has benefitted from
this military largesse toward the JSF; Lockheed Martin established
a manufacturing plant outside of Burlington, bringing thousands of
jobs to Vermont.409 Additionally, Vermont is the first state
scheduled to receive the new JSFs, with a shipment slated for the
Vermont Air National Guard in 2019.410 Senator Sanders has
clearly taken notice of these developments and has consistently
voted for Vermont jobs and jets.411
B. THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S SECOND ACCELERANT: THE DECLINE
IN FIRSTHAND CONGRESSIONAL MILITARY EXPERIENCE412

Second, the dramatic decrease in the number of veterans serving
in Congress has further accelerated the two-military divide’s effects.
The military is an increasingly independent institution in both
perception and practice that is further removed from civil society.413
The discontinuation of the draft in 1973 ended compulsory military
service.414 Military service is no longer a shared societal experience
in the age of an all-volunteer force.415 In addition, congressional
military experience and oversight of military matters have fallen to
407 See Bukszpan, supra note 404 (describing Sanders’s relatively dovish military policy
proposals).
408 See id. (noting Sanders’s continued support for the program).
409 See id. (describing the 1,400 jobs created in Chittenden County as a result of the F-35
program).
410 See Jess Aloe, F-35 in Vermont: The Economic Footprint, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS
(Sept. 14, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/2018/09/14/f-35jet-vermont-economic-footprint-air-national-guard/1041153002/ (discussing when the Guard
will receive a shipment of the FSJs).
411 See Bukszpan, supra note 404 (restating some of Sanders’s comments about the
program’s benefits for the state of Vermont).
412 For a wider discussion of the methodology of this study, see Danielle L. Lupton, Out of
the Service, Into the House: Military Experience and Congressional War Oversight, 70 POL.
RES. Q. 327 (Jan. 2017).
413 See BROOKS, supra note 11, at 14 (“[T]he U.S. military itself—as a human institution—
has grown more and more sharply delineated from the broader society . . . .”).
414 See David E. Rosenbaum, Nation Ends Draft, Turns to Volunteers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28,
1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/28/archives/nation-ends-draft-turns-to-volunteersmessage-from-laird-hopes.html (noting the end of the draft in January 1973).
415 See David Auerswald & Colton Campbell, Introduction, in CONGRESS IN CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS 202 (2015) (observing a trend in the United States “where the volunteer military
is increasingly disconnected from the average American”).
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historic lows. For example, Goldwater-Nichols was passed when
military service in both congressional chambers was near 70%.416
Now, it has plummeted to below 20%, and this decline has led to
oversight ramifications.417 The rise of the operational military has
coincided with a decrease in congressional standing and trust as a
public institution; in contrast, the military remains one of the few
public institutions that enjoys a favorable standing in the eyes of
the American public. A recent Gallup poll showed that 72% of people
had “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military but
only 12% of the population felt the same about Congress.418
Congress, in turn, has been overly deferential in operational
military matters.419
Recent political science research has begun to shine light on the
consequences of this decrease in the number of veterans in Congress
for voting patterns and oversight over operational military
matters.420 Two statistically significant voting trends are emerging.
First, members of Congress with military experience were more
likely to vote to increase congressional access to information during
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.421 This trend is intuitive. Veteran
members of Congress—regardless of political party or gender—will
better understand the type of information necessary to wage war,
contextualize it accordingly, and not excessively defer to the

416 See Mary Jordan, After Iraq and Afghanistan, Pioneering Women in the Military Set
Sights on Congress, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2018/02/07/237865a2-fad7-11e7-8f66-2df0b94bb98a_story.html?utm_term=.76efdf93b911
(“In the 1980s, more than 70 percent of House and Senate members had served in the
military.”).
417 See Lupton, supra note 412, at 331–32 (discussing the drop in Congress members who
have served in the military); see also Jordan, supra note 416 (noting that in 2018 about 20%
of Congress members had served in the military).
418 See Jordan, supra note 416 (discussing the Gallup polls of confidence regarding the
military and Congress).
419 See Kohn, supra note 246, at 17 (explaining the deference military officials feel in
operational decision-making).
420 See Danielle Lupton, Having Fewer Veterans in Congress Makes it Less Likely to
Restrain the President’s Use of
Force,
WASH. POST (Nov.
10,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/10/fewer-veterans-serve-incongress-every-term-that-makes-congress-less-likely-to-rein-in-the-presidents-use-offorce/?utm_term=.a9a5f427634f (discussing Lupton’s research on voting patterns and
operational oversight by Congress).
421
Id.
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military.422 Veterans in Congress are more likely to ask the right
questions and not give military leadership a pass.423 Second,
members of Congress with military experience are more likely to
limit the use of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, limit their
redeployment to an operational theater, and exercise control over
American military personnel in a combat theater.424
Goldwater-Nichols was passed during a time of relatively high
levels of firsthand military experience in Congress.425 Those days
are long gone and, absent a draft, those numbers are not returning.
These early political science findings have implications for war
termination, further accelerating the decline in civilian control of
the operational military.426
Congress’s lack of familiarity with operational military matters
should not be confused with a lack of interest. Consider the recent
operational military tragedy in Niger, where four special operations
forces were tragically killed in an operation largely out of sight of
the American people.427 The existence of troops in Africa caught
many Americans—and foreign policy experts in Congress—offguard.428 Many senior members of Congress with military oversight
responsibilities professed ignorance of the very existence of military
troops in Niger and neighboring African countries.429 But the
existence of these troops should have come as no surprise. After all,
Africa Command is the newest geographic combatant command and

422 See id. (arguing this thesis to explain the data on voting patterns discussed); see also
Auerswald & Campbell, supra note 415, at 4 (explaining that civilians do not easily
understand military operations compared to veterans).
423 See Lupton, supra note 412, at 333–36 (discussing veteran Congress members’ general
scrutiny on military issues and policy).
424 See id. (noting the general trends in veteran Congress members’ voting on military
policy and issues).
425 See Jordan, supra note 416 (noting the percentage of veterans in Congress overtime).
426 See Lupton, supra note 420, at 333–36 (arguing the effects of this decrease in veteran
representation in Congress).
427 See James G. Meek, U.S. Soldiers killed in Niger were outgunned, ‘Left Behind’ in Hunt
for ISIS Leader, ABC NEWS (May 3, 2018, 1:05 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/ussoldiers-killed-niger-outgunned-left-hunt-isis/story?id=54909240 (stating that four special
operations soldiers were killed); see Searcy & Schmitt, supra note 42, at A5 (explaining that
congressmen did not know of troops in Niger).
428 See Searcey & Schmitt, supra note 42, at A5 (“The United States has about 800 service
members in Niger, yet the scale of its military operations there surprised even two highranking senators . . . .”).
429 See id.
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has been fully operational since 2008.430 Military operations in
Africa have steadily increased since that time.431 The Pentagon has
also consistently maintained that Congress was appropriately
informed in accordance with the War Powers Resolution.432
C. THE TOOLS OF MODERN WARFARE FURTHER EMPOWER THE
OPERATIONAL MILITARY

Finally, the remarkable tools of modern warfare further
empower the operational military at the expense of civilian
oversight. Today, these operational military commanders—often
out of sight and far removed from the American public—
increasingly possess the awesome legal authority to utilize all the
tools of modern warfare.433 Military and Executive Branch officials
increasingly favor utilizing all the tools of modern warfare including
cyber warfare, special operations forces, and drones.434
The rise of special operations forces illustrates this trend.435
SOCOM is the very embodiment of the operational military, with
special training and amplified operational legal authorities.436
Increasingly SOF operates pursuant to covert action authorities,
430 See About the Command, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, https://www.africom.mil/about-thecommand (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (explaining that African Command started initial
operations in 2007 and became fully operational in 2008).
431 See, e.g., Eric Schewe, Why is the U.S. Military Occupying Bases Across Africa?, JSTOR:
DAILY (April 11, 2018), https://daily.jstor.org/why-is-the-u-s-military-occupying-bases-acrossafrica/ (suggesting that involvement in Africa has increased since President Bush’s
administration and that it continues today).
432 See, e.g., Alice Friend, DoD’s Report on the Investigation into the 2017 Ambush in Niger,
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD. (May 15, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/dodsreport-investigation-2017-ambush-niger (stating that the Trump administration maintains
it can continue operations in Niger because of War Powers notifications).
433 See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Pentagon Puts Cyberwarriors on the Offensive, Increasing the
Risk of Conflict, N. Y. TIMES (June 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/
us/politics/cyber-command-trump.html (explaining that the United States has switched from
a defensive to offensive position with cyber-attacks); W.J. Hennigan, The New American Way
of War, TIME (Nov. 30, 2017), http://time.com/5042700/inside-new-american-way-of-war/
(describing the widespread use of special operations); Ken Dilanian & Courtney Kube, Trump
Administration Wants to Increase CIA Drone Strikes, NBC NEWS (Sep. 18, 2017)
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/trump-admin-wants-increase-cia-drone-strikesn802311 (reasoning that Trump plans to expand the use of drones for airstrikes).
434 Id.
435 See Hennigan, supra note 433 (“Name a country in the world’s most volatile regions and
it is likely that Special Operations forces are deployed there).
436 See 10 U.S.C. § 167 (2012) (giving special operations the power to train and other
generally broad powers).
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secret operations where Congress and the American people may
never be notified of their occurrence.437 Elite, well-trained,
possessing a “light footprint,” and incredibly effective, special
operators have become the darling of Congress and the Executive
Branch with a corresponding massive increase in budget in recent
years.438 The public, too, has become enamored with their exploits,
fueled by Hollywood films and media stories about their heroism.439
Clearly, special forces are a brilliant tactical tool. However, their
widespread (and possibly excessive) use as the military tool of choice
raises fundamental concerns about how the U.S. goes to war and
conducts operations. The widespread employment of special
operations forces since 9/11 (often unknown to the American people)
helps avoid broader discussions of the number of “boots on the
ground” in a particular conflict that could raise questions about how
the U.S. military is employing its forces overseas.440
The Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act
established SOCOM.441 It is a unique functional combatant
command in that it also possesses awesome operational military
authorizations
and
additional
administrative
military
442
443
authorities. It is not limited by geographic boundaries. And it
is no exaggeration to state that special operations forces operate
nearly everywhere—at last count they were in 137 nations.444
Despite being a small fraction of the military at just 5%, they now

437 See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e) (2012) (defining “covert action”); see generally, SEAN NAYLOR,
RELENTLESS STRIKE: THE SECRET HISTORY OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (2015)
(discussing the rise of Joint Special Operations Command).
438 See Todd South, Special Operations Command Asks for More Troops, Biggest Budget
Yet,
MIL.
TIMES
(Feb.
24,
2018),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/yourarmy/2018/02/23/special-operations-command-asks-for-more-troops-biggest-budget-yet/
(stating that between fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018, the special operations budget
increased from 11.8 billion to 12.6 billion dollars.).
439 See, e.g., ZERO DARK THIRTY (Columbia 2012) (depicting the special operation to kill
Osama Bin Laden).
440 See Hennigan, supra note 433 (noting that special forces have become “an alternative
to sending thousands of conventional military forces to hot spots and risking the political
blowback”).
441 See 10 U.S.C. § 167 (2012) (establishing special operations).
442 See id. (describing the powers given to special operations).
443 See id. (describing the powers of combatant command without mentioning geography);
see also JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at II (describing worldwide goals).
444 See Turse, supra note 41 (stating that special operations are deployed in seventy percent
of the world and have been deployed to 137 countries in 2017).
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account for the majority of casualties.445 Because of their stealth,
lethality, and expertise, special operations forces are increasingly
the tools of choice for Executive Branch officials.446 SOCOM’s
activities are often cloaked in secrecy and occur outside the United
States.447 Special operations often operate in so called “gray zone”
conflicts pursuant to covert action authorities that are often out of
sight of the American public.448 But is Congress attempting to reign
in or otherwise examine the widespread use of special operations in
light of this dramatic shift in the nature of warfare? No.449
Congress has facilitated the rise of SOCOM by routinely
increasing SOCOM’s role and expanding its budget.450 It has also
seen an expansion of legal authorities where all active and reserve
special operations forces stationed in the United States are assigned
to SOCOM, creating what has been described as a “fifth branch of
the military” to complement the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast
Guard.451 Not only do special operations forces enjoy dual
operational and administrative authorities, they increasingly
operate pursuant to both title 10 and title 50 (covert action)
authorities, providing the President with remarkable lethality,
flexibility, and a truncated decision-making process.452 Because of
these dual command authorities, SOCOM may be fairly described
445 See Hennigan, supra note 433 (stating that special operations forces comprise almost
all casualties despite only being 5% of military forces).
446 See, e.g., id. (“Obama had shifted the burden of the fight against the insurgencies to
commandos.”).
447 See Searcey & Schmitt, supra note 42, at A5 (noting that Congress has little insight into
how special operations forces are used).
448 See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e) (2012) (“‘[C]overt action’ means an activity or activities of the
United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad,
where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly. . . .” (emphasis added)); see Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence
Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 539–54
(2012) (describing the conflict between Title 10 and Title 50 and the implications on public
knowledge).
449 But see 10 U.S.C. § 130(f) (2012) (requiring that Congress be informed of military
operations under certain circumstances); Rudesill, supra note 77, at 64 (asserting that the
DoD “increasingly reports to Congress about such operations in a manner that begins to
approach the covert action process”).
450 See ANDREW FEICKERT, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RS21048, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES (SOF): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1–2 (updated October 29, 2018)
(outlining changes in special operations over the past years).
451 See 10 U.S.C. § 167(b) (2012) (stating how assignments of reserve members will occur).
452 See Chesney, supra note 448, at 539–40, 601–02 (discussing presidential power within
the context of the emerging trend of convergence in military operations).
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as a “super combatant-command.”453 Within SOCOM, the executive
branch increasingly uses Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC) for the most dangerous missions; its truncated chain of
command, expertise, lethality, and overall effectiveness is
legendary.454 In addition, while all agencies are delegated authority
from Congress, the DoD delegates internally from the President as
Commander in Chief to lower tactical commanders.455 These
delegations have been primarily focused on providing increased
authority to the operational military commanders, which often
involves the loosening of the rules of engagement.456
In sum, if civilian control of the military is better understood as
a process, Congress should continue to play a more meaningful role
in this process. The Legislative Branch serves as the connective
tissue between the military and citizenry. However, Congress is
largely absent from existing core processes including the
operational military’s creation and design as set forth by the UCP
plan and the yearly NDAA budget process where Congress focuses
disproportionately on administrative military matters.457 The lack
of firsthand congressional military experience that influences
voting in operational military matters further exacerbates this
absence. Meanwhile, the operational military’s power and influence
continues to grow without comparable oversight.

453 See id. (discussing the difficulties arising between title 10 and title 50); see also JOINT
PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at III-6, III-7 (“[SOCOM] is unique among the [Combatant
Commands] in that it performs Service-like functions [to] organize, train, equip, and provide
combat-ready SOF to the other [Combatant Commands] . . . .”).
454 See Chesney, supra note 448, at 574–75 (describing JSOC’s rise in the post-911 era).
455 See supra Part III.A.
456 See id. at 540 (demonstrating how increased convergence of military operations blurs
the lines of acceptable conduct under the rules leading to less accountability).
457 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO REMEDY THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S
EFFECTS
A. IMPROVING CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT WITH A NEW MODEL FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY GOVERNANCE

Goldwater-Nichols, passed in the aftermath of military tragedy,
was in many ways a stunning success. It improved war-fighting,
empowered operational military commanders, diminished interservice rivalry, and centralized the way the President and civilian
military leadership received military advice.458
However, its legacy is mixed, and its ambitions overshot in many
important respects. At its core, Goldwater-Nichols is a Cold War
statute designed for a far different time. The world has changed
dramatically since the law’s passage in 1986, and the military is
becoming an increasingly independent institution further removed
from the American citizenry that it is sworn to protect.459
Goldwater-Nichols empowered the operational combatant
commanders in invisible or unintended ways; the result is to
weaken civilian control of the operational military and create an
enduring two-military bureaucracy.460 The law incentivized
congressional focus on administrative matters at the expense of
operational ones, accelerating the two-military divide—and despite
its stated objective, it failed to rein in the massively inefficient
administrative bureaucracy and expensive acquisitions process.461
It remains unclear whether members of Congress understand the
scope and scale of institutional executive drift, despite some
hopeful, initial steps by ranking members (themselves veterans) of
See infra Part III (discussing Goldwater-Nichols).
See Yoo, supra note 256, at 2283–92 (discussing the military’s growing independence
from political leadership since the end of World War II). It is also becoming increasingly
outdated, as was evidenced by James Lochner’s statement that “[t]he typical 20th century
organization has not operated well in a rapidly changing environment. Structure, systems,
practices, and culture have often been more of a drag on change than a facilitator. If
environmental volatility continues to increase, as most people now predict, the standard
organization of the 20th century will likely become a dinosaur.” Goldwater-Nichols Hearings,
supra note 15, at 5–6 (statement of James Locher).
460 See supra Part IV.
461 See James R. Locher III, Has it Worked?—The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,
54 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 95, 95–96, 111–12 (2001) (examining the changes instituted by the
Goldwater-Nichols Act and assessing whether they have worked).
458
459
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the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) to revise GoldwaterNichols 30 years after its passage.462 Indeed, the time is right for a
third major national security act to complement and partially
replace the National Security Act and Goldwater-Nichols Act. This
new act should first take an honest assessment of how the military
functions across the world and address the operational military’s
ever-expanding foreign relations and non-military functions.
Lawmakers should acknowledge that the expanding definition of
“national security” should not default to military solutions.463
Today, other agencies (USAID, State) play an increasingly
important role in national security governance and decisionmaking, but their budgets (and influence) are waning.464 While all
agencies now compete with one another for personnel and funding,
the DoD is by far the largest agency at 3.2 million people and a
budget in excess of $680 billion a year.465
This Part presents recommendations to increase congressional
oversight and to update the Goldwater-Nichols Act for the twentyfirst century. After 9/11, Congress passed the comprehensive
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that reformed
the intelligence community and established the Secretary of
Homeland Security as a Cabinet-level official.466 Yet no such act
emerged to address DoD's governing legal architecture. The
Goldwater-Nichols Act remains largely unchanged from its Cold
War origins. And despite calls for defense reform, it remains intact.
Concerns about the derogation of civilian control of the military
are more important and timelier than ever. At the time of this
writing, there are just two civilians providing executive branch
See generally Goldwater-Nichols Hearings, supra note 15.
National security is not defined in law, but is defined by DoD in joint doctrine. Its
capacious definition includes “[a] collective term encompassing both national defense and
foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining . . . [a] military or defense
advantage over any foreign nation . . . [a] favorable foreign relations position . . . [a] defense
posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without,
overt or covert.” DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 162.
464 See generally OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, AN AMERICAN BUDGET: BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT (2019) (detailing each department’s and agencies’ budget for the fiscal year
2019 as well as the goals for this year’s budget).
465 See id. (noting the changes in commands and overseas operations for the fiscal year);
see also McCarthy, supra note 26 (discussing the DoD’s large employment power).
466 See generally Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (citing its purposes as the reform of the intelligence community
and its related activities).
462
463
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oversight over the operational military: President Trump and acting
Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan. And the President has shown
an increased willingness to delegate more authority to operational
military commanders in the field, at times loosening rules of
engagement while delegating responsibilities to his military
operational commanders.467 Money continues to flow to the DoD as
one of the few federal agencies receiving funding increases.468
A new national security law should address the complex
international security environment through the establishment of a
more holistic government approach to complex international
security issues. A more balanced and interagency-focused
Goldwater-Nichols would better integrate other agencies into the
national security apparatus. What Goldwater-Nichols did for
“jointness” in bringing the different services together,469 a new law
can do for an interagency national security apparatus. Consider the
following five ideas.
First, we are simply asking too much from one person, the
Secretary of Defense, to referee disputes between the
administrative and operational militaries as well as civilian and
military leadership. Within the operational military’s chain of
command there is just one level of civilian oversight (the Secretary
of Defense) before reaching the Commander in Chief.470 In contrast,
the administrative military has two levels of oversight, ensuring an
additional “civilian buffer.”471 One immediate, logical step is to
simply require a commensurate amount of civilian control across
both militaries. If three civilians oversee the administrative
military, why should two civilians be responsible for operational
military oversight? To remedy this, a new law should create a
civilian “combatant commander secretary” to help oversee the
military combatant commands and operational military. This would

467 See Helene Cooper, Trump Gives Military New Freedom, but With That Comes Danger,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2017, at A12 (suggesting that a new command style may increase the
potential for civilian casualties).
468 See OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, AN AMERICAN BUDGET: BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, supra note 464 (discussing the budget for military activities).
469 See discussion supra Part III (noting the strengths of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in
fostering more unity in the military).
470 See 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2012) (setting forth the role the Secretary of Defense).
471 See discussion supra Part III (arguing that Goldwater-Nichols further allowed for the
administrative military to have far more oversight than the operational military).
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provide an equal level of civilian oversight of both militaries, freeing
up the Secretary of Defense to delegate certain oversight authorities
to these combatant command officials.
This would provide several advantages and would obviate any
perception that the Secretaries of the military departments provide
some modicum of control over operational military matters. Ideally,
the civilian combatant command secretary would be a senior official
with deep foreign policy experience and relationships within a
particular geographic area. He or she could guide the military
combatant commander as the military combatant commander
learns the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Oftentimes, the military
combatant commander was never stationed in that particular part
of the world and faces a steep learning curve with regards to the
area’s language, culture, and regional dynamics. And there is
precedent for such a role: we recognized the importance of having
senior diplomats in both Iraq and Afghanistan during major combat
operations with the appointment of Ambassador Ryan Crocker to
Iraq and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Afghanistan.472
Alternatively, co-equal ambassadors or foreign policy experts
could be incorporated into the operational military’s command to
guide and assist the geographic combatant commanders. This is an
intermediate step to help ensure a more holistic, integrated
government approach to foreign policy. These co-equal ambassadors
should be placed directly in the chain of command and staffed
accordingly. This would help ensure continuity and a cohesive
diplomatic/military voice in international relations.
Taking this first step adds an additional layer of civilian control
of the military, mirroring the administrative military. It also
ensures foreign policy expertise and a non-military voice on complex
international relations and foreign policy matters. It is also a frank
acknowledgment that the military is called upon to do numerous
missions, not because they have the expertise, but because they are
there. Too often this leads to military solutions for non-military
472 See Scott Shane, Ryan Clark Crocker, a Diplomat Used to Danger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/06/world/middleeast/06crocker.html (discussing
Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker appointment to Iraq); see also Robert D. McFadden, Strong
American Voice in Diplomacy and Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/world/14holbrooke.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh
=CFFD0B5B1A2D73E0C6F2DE24F79AD423&gwt=pay (discussing Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke and his appointment).
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problems. If you are a hammer, complex national security problems
too often appear as nails. And that hammer is only getting bigger.473
This is also a realistic, rational step to help counteract the massive
budgetary discrepancy between the DoD and other national
security-related agencies.
Second, the combatant commands, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, State Department, and intelligence community all lack an
aligned geographic framework for defining the regions of the world.
Why? Too often they are, literally, not on the same page (or map).474
Even the Office of the Secretary of Defense is organized differently
than the Unified Command Plan.475 This unnecessarily handicaps
policy development and integration across the government. One
agency zigs while the other zags. As national security governance
requires tools of diplomacy, intelligence, military, and economics,
there should be one, single aligned national security and foreign
policy “map” that integrates all critical actors and takes advantage
of the power of alignment.
Third, we should strongly consider providing a more formalized
mechanism for dissent and take steps to decentralize the military
advice that is given to the President, Security of Defense, and
National Security Council. Centralization and unification has
advantages, but it also comes with costs.476 Under GoldwaterNichols, military advice is now transmitted via one person, the
CJCS.477 While each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Army,

473 See Cooper, supra 467 (discussing the military’s new freedom under the Trump
administration).
474 For example, the combatant commands have six geographic combatant commands
(Northern, Southern, Africa, Europe, Pacific, and Central) while the State Department has
six different regions (Africa, Europe and Eurasia, Near East, Western Hemisphere, East Asia
and Pacific, and South Asia), and the CIA Intelligence Directorate has five (Asia Pacific, Latin
America, Africa, Near East and South Asia, and Russia and Europe). See MURDOCK ET AL.,
supra note 35, at 37–38 (recommending the creation of a “common regional framework” across
the U.S. government).
475 See id. at 37 n.28 (“The Office of the Secretary of Defense divides the world into four
regions: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Near East and South Asia, and Western Hemisphere.”).
476 See POSNER, supra note 226, at 42–43 (noting the difficulties of transmitting intelligence
information in a centralized structure).
477 See 10 U.S.C. § 151(d) (2012) (setting guidelines for communicating opinions of members
other than the Chairman).
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Navy, Air Force, Marines) may submit a matter in dissent, that
opinion is transmitted via the CJCS, who submits his own advice.478
Unlike the other members of the Joint Staff, the CJCS has
several advantages. First, he is widely recognized as the senior
military officer in the DoD, affording him a special status as “first
among equals” as the face of the military to the media and American
public.479 Second, the CJCS is focused on operational military
matters and lacks administrative responsibilities such as staffing,
training, and equipping that are the outsized focus of the
administrative military leadership.480 Finally, the Chairman’s Joint
Staff may be the most effective staff in government, and the staff is
predominantly composed of active-duty military forces.481 Day to
day, the Chairman and his staff only serve the operational military
and the operational chain of command,482 potentially undermining
the important role of the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense.
A revised Goldwater-Nichols should authorize a legal mechanism
for the top civilian leaders to hear a wide variety of voices across the
services and provide mechanisms for dissent. This would have the
additional benefit of providing a more direct linkage between the
operational military and administrative military.
Fourth, we should review and overhaul the national security
budgetary process. The National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) funds the DoD,483 while a separate funding process exists
for the other national security agencies (e.g. State, USAID,
Homeland Security).484 While Congress often focuses on
administrative matters within the NDAA, it does receive a baseline
478 See id. (“A member . . . may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion . . . [which]
the Chairman shall present . . . at the same time he presents his own advice. . . .”).
479 See
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
https://www.jcs.mil/About/the-Joint-Staff/chairman/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (recognizing
the “Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff as the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces”).
480 See MURDOCK ET AL., supra note 35, at 24 (noting that the Chairman’s chief
responsibilities are operational in nature).
481 See About the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, https://www.jcs.mil/About/
(last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (noting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consists of at least one
representative from each of the branches of military—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,
and National Guard).
482 See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supra note 479 (noting that the Chairman
and his staff “transmit communications to the combatant commands”).
483 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
484 See MURDOCK ET AL., supra note 35, at 34, 42 (noting the inconsistencies in budgeting
processes across individual agencies and pointing out the need for interagency budgeting).
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of congressional attention every year. A massive monetary infusion
in USAID and State is unlikely anytime soon, but they clearly play
a critical (albeit diminished role) in responding to national security
crisis. Why not integrate State and USAID funding into the existing
NDAA process? Alternatively, the NDAA could include an
operational/foreign policy section that integrates the budgets for the
core national security agencies or reinvigorate the Office of
Management and Budget’s role in refereeing national security
priorities.
Fifth, the administrative military should be accountable to the
operational military for the equipment, weapons, and personnel
that it provides to the commanders in the field. Put simply, the DoD
and administrative military “is structured to plan and prepare for
war, but not to fight one.”485 A revised Goldwater-Nichols should
mandate a synchronization cell with command and control
authority to ensure that the administrative military is responsive
in real time to the requirements of the operational military. At this
time, this is done via the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC), but this entity lacks full legal authority to ensure
oversight.486
Finally, while there are signs that Congress might take a fresh
look at Goldwater-Nichols with the potential of breathing new life
into legislative oversight, more must be done. In 2016, Senators
McCain (R-AZ) and Reed (D-RI) held bipartisan hearings on the
need for a new Goldwater-Nichols Act, but future legislation
remains uncertain.487 Any legislative change should focus on
breathing life into legislative oversight of the operational military,
addressing the core unintended consequence of the GoldwaterNichols Act. This includes members of Congress taking a greater
role in the combatant commanders’ budget process and developing
a better understanding of their roles in foreign policy. Right now,
the geographic combatant commanders are required to brief

See MCINNIS, supra note 130, at 14 (quoting former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates).
See 10 U.S.C. § 181 (2012) (describing mission and composition the JROC).
487 See Sen. McCain Issues Opening Statement at Hearing on Defense Budget Request for
FY 2017, TARGETED NEWS SERV., Mar. 17, 2016 (quoting Sen. John McCain) (“[A]nother
priority of this Committee will remain the defense reform effort that we began last year,
including a review of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation that is now marking its thirtieth
anniversary.”).
485
486
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Congress once a year.488 In light of their already robust role in
foreign policy and statecraft, they should be required to brief
congressional leaders semi-annually.
And Congress should be actively engaged in exercising its
investigatory power to better understand where combatant
commanders are requesting forces to be deployed throughout the
world—particularly special operations forces. This is particularly
important for areas that are seeing an increased American force
presence (Philippines, Africa, Southeast Asia).489 Too often,
Congress appears to be caught off-guard about these operations.490
With a continual Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) in
place and a NDAA passed every year, combatant commanders
possess the legal and fiscal authority to conduct a wide range of
missions outside the public eye.491 Congress should be better
informed and engaged on these missions.
B. REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT TO BETTER
REFLECT MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL REALITIES

As discussed in Part IV, the APA is no longer aligned with the
organizational realities of the two-military state. The APA was
passed just one year before the National Security Act and forty
years prior to Goldwater-Nichols and remains antiquated as applied
to the modern military.492 As a general matter, most administrative
military actions that occur within the United States remain subject

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See Brad Lendon, China’s reaction to U.S. Navy Operation: We Have Missiles, CNN (Jan.
10, 2019, 8:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/10/asia/china-missiles-south-china-seaintl/index.html (noting Chinese displeasure with U.S. Naval presence in South China Sea);
Greg Myre, The Military Doesn’t Advertise It, But U.S. Troops Are All Over Africa, NPR (Apr.
28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/04/28/605662771/the-military-doesntadvertise-it-but-u-s-troops-are-all-over-africa (noting the U.S. presence in Africa extends
across roughly 20 African countries).
490 See, e.g., Daniella Diaz, Key Senators Say They Didn’t Know the U.S. Had Troops in
Niger, CNN (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/23/politics/niger-troopslawmakers/index.html (“‘I did not,’ Sen. Bob Casey, D-Pennsylvania, responded to CNN’s
Chris Cuomo on ‘New Day’ Monday whether he knew there were troops in Niger.”).
491 See supra Part III (noting how the operational military has been granted broader warmaking authority at the expense of congressional oversight).
492
See supra Part IV.C.
488
489
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to the APA while most operational military actions taken by
combatant commands are not subject to the APA.493
First, the definition of “agency” should be updated. Specifically,
the APA is silent on how administrative law should address actions
taken by combatant commanders. Both the Secretaries of the
military departments and combatant commands are one step below
the Secretary of Defense in the DoD hierarchy, but only the
Secretaries of the military departments are “agencies” within the
plain meaning of the APA.494
Second, the APA exemptions should be reformed to eliminate
“the time of war” exemption to more precisely address the military
activities that take place in peace and the expanding menu of
actions short of war. For example, the operational military does
conduct certain “gray area” activities that are neither purely
administrative nor operational.495 Both the United States Navy and
Coast Guard conduct a wide range of activities on the high seas and
outside the United States that may be fairly described as
“readiness” activities that are hard to clearly define and are not
purely wartime activities.496 As operational activities, however, they
currently fall outside the APA’s jurisdiction.
The military function exception should also be updated and
defined more precisely. Rulemaking and adjudications that involve
“the conduct of military or foreign affairs functions” are exempt.497
Notice of a proposed rule, opportunity for public comment, and
publication of the final rule are central to administrative law.
Courts have struggled to determine what, exactly, is a military
function, applying the military function exemption to the creation
of temporary security zones498 and to the determination of death of
493 Compare Story v. Marsh, 574 F. Supp. 505, 514 (E.D. Mo. 1983), rev’d., 732 F.2d 1375
(8th Cir. 1984) (holding that an Army Corps administrative decision was a “rulemaking
decision” within the meaning of and subject to the APA) with Masur, supra note 297, at 512–
13 (stating that “the only cognizable exceptions that might exempt a military agency . . . from
APA strictures are the narrow ones written into the statute itself” including military
authority exercised in the field during “time of war”).
494 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (2012) (listing military departments under “agency” definition).
495 See supra Part IV.C.1.
496 See Breyer Oral Argument, supra note 336, at 35 (discussing the difficulty for judges to
make to make these types of determinations).
497 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4) (2012).
498 See United States v. Ventura-Melendez, 321 F.2d. 320, 323 (2003) (holding that
establishing a security zone is exempt from APA rules under 10 U.S.C. §§ 552–553).
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a service member because it involved military affairs and public
benefits.499
Of course, any attempt to reconcile the APA with the modern
military organization may run against significant headwinds within
the DoD. And they will likely assert that this will only harm
military readiness by exposing an increased number of activities to
judicial review. But the APA has had an enormous impact in
making governmental activity “more open, accountable, and
responsive to the public than in any other country”500 and can play
a powerful role in ensuring civilian control of the military.501
CONCLUSION
The Goldwater-Nichols Act, passed in 1986 in the aftermath of
several military misadventures, managed to reduce interservice
rivalry through emphasis on joint warfare but failed to reinforce
civilian control over the military. Instead, it discouraged
congressional involvement in the hard questions by increasing the
authority and autonomy of geographic combatant commanders at
the heart of the operational military. Today, Congress remains
focused on the administrative military. We are witnessing increased
executive drift facilitated by this Act and the two-military divide.
This trend comes into sharper relief as the military looks to
future conflicts and takes on new missions. The administrative
military is legally and doctrinally at the operational military’s
service, and its leadership is accountable when forces are not
combat ready. But it is strange indeed to assign accountability when
the administrative military lacks control over its own priorities,
which are shaped by congressional preferences.
When the Congress focuses solely on the administrative military,
it abrogates its constitutional responsibility to be a coequal partner
in answering the following questions: Should we be operating in
hundreds of nations in such a manner? What is the precise scope of
the AUMF? What is the desired end state? At the time of this

499 See McDonald v. McLucas, 371 F. Supp. 837, 840 (1973) (holding that the APA did not
apply).
500 See JAMES RASBAND ET AL., supra note 298, at 223.
501 Id.
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writing, we are still in the longest period of armed conflict in
American history—when will this end?
The answers to these questions will remain unsatisfactory
absent a congressional awakening or renewed interest by the
American public. Our nation’s strong tradition of civilian control of
the military is shaped more by historical practice and constitutional
norms than by the few black letter legal provisions. As we look to
the military’s future in increasingly dangerous times with growing
pressures on civil-military relations, we must understand the
military’s modern agency design and its consequences. Only then
can we act to shape the future of civil-military relations and sustain
a military that safeguards our national security while remaining
subordinate to civilian leadership.
The Congress owes it to the American people to engage with
matters of state. Our nation’s strong tradition of civilian control of
the military is shaped more by custom than law and cannot be taken
for granted. And as the Supreme Court noted in Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, “[t]he supremacy of the civil over the military is one
of our great heritages.”502

502

327 U.S. 304, 325 (1945).
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